Rochester Institute of Technology

RIT Scholar Works
Theses

Thesis/Dissertation Collections

5-4-2017

Examining the New York State Gun Involved
Violence Elimination Initiative’s Alignment with
Several Theoretical Perspectives
Jamie Dougherty
jmd7019@rit.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses
Recommended Citation
Dougherty, Jamie, "Examining the New York State Gun Involved Violence Elimination Initiative’s Alignment with Several Theoretical
Perspectives" (2017). Thesis. Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed from

This Master's Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Thesis/Dissertation Collections at RIT Scholar Works. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of RIT Scholar Works. For more information, please contact ritscholarworks@rit.edu.

Examining the New York State Gun Involved
Violence Elimination Initiative’s Alignment with
Several Theoretical Perspectives
by

Jamie Dougherty
A Capstone Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Science in Criminal Justice
Department of Criminal Justice
College of Liberal Arts

Rochester Institute of Technology
Rochester, NY
May 4, 2017

Running head: NYS GIVE’S ALIGNMENT WITH THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Examining the New York State Gun Involved Violence Elimination Initiative’s
Alignment with Several Theoretical Perspectives
Jamie Dougherty
Rochester Institute of Technology

Author Note
Jamie Dougherty, Master’s Degree student, Department of Criminal Justice, Rochester
Institute of Technology.
This research was supported by a grant from the New York State Division of Criminal
Justice Services. The research was supported by principal investigators Dr. John Klofas and Dr.
Irshad Altheimer and several evaluators for GIVE: Dr. Makini Beck, Dr. Lisa Clark, Michelle
Comeau, Dr. Janelle Duda-Banwar, Alysia Mason, Dr. Thomas Noel, Akshay Paliwal, Sujeong
Seo, Ashley Vasquez, and Dr. Jason Willis. The work would not have been possible without the
participation and support of staff from DCJS and GIVE partner agencies.
Correspondence should be addressed to Dr. John Klofas, Dept. of Criminal Justice, RIT,
EAS (Bldg. 1), 93 Lomb Memorial Drive, Rochester, NY 14623. Contact: jmkgcj@rit.edu

1

NYS GIVE’S ALIGNMENT WITH THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

2

Abstract
This research examines how well New York State’s Gun Involved Violence Elimination (GIVE)
initiative aligns with four theoretical domains: subculture of violence, deterrence, rational
choice/situational crime prevention, and implementation theories. It reviews how procedural
justice and community integration align with these theories and the evidence-based strategies
that GIVE sites implement. Sites are grouped for analysis, and their characteristics are
described. The literature review describes each theoretical domain’s core principles as they
pertain to GIVE. It shows that the theories can be compatible and that their integration is difficult
but would likely make the initiative more effective. The primary research questions pertain to
how closely GIVE aligns with each of these theories, as well as whether sites with similar
characteristics utilize these theoretical perspectives differently. The data collection and analysis
methods are described. The analysis finds that theories and strategies that readily align with
traditional law enforcement functions are the most likely to be fully adopted by law enforcement
agencies, so street outreach strategies tend to be under-utilized while deterrence strategies are
most embraced. Larger sites with higher shooting rates tend to have more comprehensive GIVE
programs and align better with theory due to having gun violence problems characterized by
subcultures of violence and other principles on which the strategies are built. However, mediumsized sites tend to deliver strategies with effective dosage; larger sites struggle to deliver enough
resources. GIVE implementation could be improved with more integration among strategies,
community integration, and deeper recognition of the theoretical insights presented here.
Keywords: gun violence, implementation, criminal justice theory, program evaluation
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Examining the New York State Gun Involved Violence Elimination Initiative’s
Alignment with Several Theoretical Perspectives
Chapter 1: Overview of GIVE
The Gun Involved Violence Elimination (GIVE) initiative is an effort to reduce gun
violence in New York State (NYS) outside of New York City. The grant program is administered
by the NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and began in 2014. The seventeen
counties outside New York City with the highest amounts of Part I crimes are provided funding
to implement evidence-based strategies to prevent and reduce gun violence. This paper provides
an overview of the GIVE initiative as part of a larger research project examining the degree to
which GIVE aligns with several theoretical perspectives related to violence and its prevention. It
describes the jurisdictions implementing GIVE and how they are grouped to aid in analysis.
History and Purpose of GIVE
From 2004 to 2014, DCJS provided funding to law enforcement agencies in the
seventeen counties that account for over eighty percent of the state’s Part I crimes outside of
New York City for crime reduction initiatives. This was called Operation IMPACT. In 2014,
DCJS began to require that these agencies focus on preventing and reducing firearm-related
homicides and non-fatal shootings (NYS DCJS, n.d.). The seventeen jurisdictions were required
to choose and implement at least one strategy from a list of evidence-based strategies and could
supplement these strategies with other efforts to address gun violence in their jurisdiction.
In the first year of GIVE (fiscal year 2014-2015), sites could choose to implement hot
spots policing, focused deterrence, street outreach, crime prevention through environmental
design (CPTED), procedural justice, and/or problem-oriented policing (POP). Starting in the
second year (fiscal year 2015-2016), sites were required to integrate procedural justice and POP
principles in all aspects of their GIVE program (each strategy as well as overall organization of
the initiative) rather than treating procedural justice and POP as separate strategies.
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Sites are required to work with a program evaluation team from RIT’s Center for Public
Safety Initiatives (CPSI). The evaluation focuses on the fidelity with which sites implement the
strategies, the state and local implementation processes, adaptations sites make to strategies to fit
local needs, training and administrative support, and outcome measures for GIVE.
Organization and Structure of the GIVE Initiative
DCJS has many departments that provide support for numerous programs, including
GIVE. The Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner of DCJS actively oversee GIVE. The
GIVE Program Manager is the primary coordinator of GIVE. Each of the seventeen jurisdictions
is assigned one of two GIVE Unit Representatives or the Program Manager (for larger sites) as
their primary liaison with DCJS. The site representatives communicate with and visit the sites
regularly and report to the Commissioner. This core team of three individuals also organizes
technical assistance, trainings, conferences, and site collaboration meetings; reviews funding
proposals; monitors finances; and coordinates with the evaluation team.
DCJS designated a State Director of SNUG Anti-Violence Initiatives to oversee SNUG, a
statewide effort to implement street outreach in cities experiencing dispute- and gang/groupdriven gun violence. Street outreach is one of the GIVE strategies. SNUG sites are required to
partner with law enforcement for data to choose a target area, receive notifications about
shootings, and vet potential street outreach staff. There are several SNUG sites in New York City
that are not GIVE sites, and there are several GIVE sites that implement street outreach activities
that are not part of SNUG. In either case, street outreach efforts are led by non-profit agencies.
In each county, the police department(s) of the major cities usually lead GIVE, but the
initiative is highly collaborative. Typically, funded partners include the primary police
department(s), the county office of probation, the county district attorney’s office, the county
sheriff’s office, and a non-profit or community partner agency. Some GIVE sites provide
funding to a research partner from a local university, and some utilize Crime Analysis and Intel
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Center resources. Unfunded law enforcement partners are frequently involved with GIVE,
including parole, NYS Police, federal agencies (ATF, ICE, US Attorney’s Office, etc.), and
neighboring police departments. For the purposes of evaluation, the seventeen counties are
treated as nineteen separate sites, since two counties have two distinct cities within them that
operate distinct GIVE programs; note that they do share county-level agencies.
DCJS has provided training, technical assistance, and networking opportunities for GIVE
sites. Training refers to classroom-style sessions that are provided to individuals from multiple
jurisdictions. Trainings are provided regularly on each of the strategies and on emerging issues
of interest. Technical assistance (TA) refers to contracting with a TA provider to deliver direct,
customized strategy support to a site over a period of time. TA is provided as requested by sites,
especially for sites implementing focused deterrence. The DCJS GIVE team also organizes
meetings of GIVE sites by region as well as an annual two-day conference for all sites for
additional training and to share site learnings.
The GIVE evaluation involved regular phone calls and site visits with each site about
their implementation. The evaluation methodology is described in detail in the next paper in this
series. Evaluators provided regular reports (written and verbal) to DCJS and participated in a
monthly conference call with the Commissioner of DCJS and all departments that support GIVE.
Note that sites’ research partners are distinct from evaluators. Research partners focus on
a specific research project that is of interest to the site or provide more intensive on-the-ground
assessment of the site’s implementation. Because RIT CPSI is Monroe County’s GIVE research
partner as well as the GIVE evaluation team, a separate agency, the Center for Governmental
Research, performs the evaluation of the Monroe County GIVE site to avoid a conflict of
interest. Monroe County is therefore not included in this analysis.
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Description of Jurisdictions
The GIVE sites are diverse on a number of dimensions, including levels and types of gun
violence. For the purposes of this capstone, the eighteen sites part of CPSI’s evaluation are split
into five groups. This analysis compares and contrasts the sites within and among these groups.
The sites are grouped according to rates of shooting victimization for the jurisdiction in
2016,1 with some exceptions. Group H (high) consists of the three sites with the highest rates of
shooting victimization. Group M (medium) has the four sites with the next highest rates of
shooting victimization, followed by the four sites in Group L (low). Group A consists of the five
sites that have little gun violence and focus on aggravated assaults (often domestic violence).
Group C consists of the two sites whose jurisdictions are counties rather than cities. These sites
have areas with high rates of gun violence (where GIVE efforts are concentrated), but the large
county populations make the shooting victimization rates for the entire jurisdiction quite low.
The following charts convey some of the diversity within and among these groupings.
Figure 1 shows the shooting victimization rates by group (i.e., how the sites were grouped).
Figure 1: 2016 Shooting Victim Rate Ranges for Site Groups

1

Crime/violence data is from the NYS DCJS Greenbook data published in February 2017 for the full calendar
year of 2016. I used the 2015 Census population estimates for each city to calculate the rates and in Figure 2
below.
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From Figure 2, it is evident that the sites in Group C have much larger populations than
all other sites. Group H (with the highest rates of shooting victimization) tends to have larger
populations, except one small site that has unusually high shooting rates. While Group M has
higher shooting victimization rates than Group L, Group L tends to have larger populations.
Finally, Group A, with low levels of gun violence, have, on average, the smallest populations.
Figure 2: Population Ranges for Site Groups (2015 Population Estimate)

Figure 3 shows the large diversity in domestic violence aggravated assault victimization
rates among the GIVE sites. Only some of the sites in Group 4 are approved to use GIVE funds
to address domestic violence aggravated assaults due to having low levels of gun violence.
Figure 3: 2016 Domestic Violence Aggravated Assault Rate Ranges for Site Groups

8
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These charts illustrate the diversity among GIVE sites in shooting victimization rates,
population, and domestic violence aggravated assault rates. There is, of course, even more
diversity in the jurisdictions’ contexts, personnel, leadership structures, and other qualitative
areas. Throughout this research, I will discuss the differences (and similarities) among GIVE
sites and the applicability of the GIVE strategies and overall initiative to these diverse
jurisdictions.
Conclusion
The NYS GIVE initiative is an innovative effort to promote the use of evidence-based
practices to reduce and prevent gun violence among law enforcement agencies. This multi-site,
state-run initiative is, to evaluators’ knowledge, the most extensive effort to do so in the nation.
The transition from IMPACT to GIVE reflects an effort by NYS DCJS to increase the use of
evidence-based practices in its funded programs, to focus on more specific problems, and to
evaluate the program closely, and to provide technical assistance and training to practitioners.
Throughout this research, I will examine how the design and implementation of GIVE at
the state and jurisdiction levels align with four theoretical perspectives: subculture of violence
theory, rational choice/situational crime prevention theories, deterrence theory, and
implementation theories. I will provide recommendations for how the program may be made
more effective by better aligning with theory. The GIVE sites are diverse but often face similar
challenges. The groupings presented above (and that will be used throughout the research) will
illustrate the common challenges of implementing this ambitious initiative. The next paper in
this series will discuss the four theoretical perspectives stated above and how they relate to urban
gun violence in general and to GIVE specifically. It will also detail the methodology for this
analysis. The research overall explores how GIVE addresses aspects of these theories while
failing to address other aspects.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Statement of Research Purpose
Research and interventions grounded in theory are more likely to be effective (Stewart &
Klein, 2016; Davies, Walker, & Grimshaw, 2010). This paper reviews literature from four
theoretical domains that relate to the New York State (NYS) Gun Involved Violence Elimination
(GIVE) initiative. GIVE funds law enforcement agencies in seventeen counties to implement
evidence-based strategies to reduce gun violence as well as an implementation and outcome
evaluation conducted by the Center for Public Safety Initiatives (CPSI) at Rochester Institute of
Technology (RIT). The four theoretical domains that will be examined here were chosen for
their broad applicability to the components and goals of GIVE and include subculture of violence
theories, deterrence theory, rational choice theories, and implementation theories. This research
will examine the effort’s degree of theoretical alignment.
Research questions to be explored include how closely the GIVE effort at the state and
jurisdictional levels aligns with each of these theories, using evaluation data from GIVE sites. It
will examine how sites with various characteristics adhere to and implement theoretical
perspectives differently. It will focus on the compatibility among these theories and whether
their combination is likely to be effective in directing strategy implementation.
Summary of the GIVE Initiative
The GIVE initiative is an effort to reduce gun violence in New York. This grant program
is administered by the NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and funds law
enforcement efforts in the seventeen counties outside of New York City with the highest amounts
of Part I crimes. The twenty participating police departments report 87% of the state’s violent
crime outside of New York City. In 2016, there were 1,047 total shooting victims in these
jurisdictions, 141 of whom were killed (NYS DCJS, 2017).
DCJS requires that funded partners focus on preventing and reducing firearm-related
homicides and non-fatal shootings (NYS DCJS, 2017) by implementing at least one strategy
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from a list of evidence-based strategies: focused deterrence, hot spots policing, crime prevention
through environmental design (CPTED), and street outreach. The principles of procedural
justice and problem-oriented policing (POP) are to be integrated in all GIVE efforts.
Implementation is collaborative. The police departments of the counties’ major cities
usually lead the GIVE program for that county. Other funded partners typically include
probation, the district attorney’s office, the sheriff’s office, and sometimes a non-profit,
community partner agency, or research partner. Unfunded partners participate in GIVE as part of
their normal work, including parole, NYS Police, federal agencies (e.g., ATF and US Attorneys),
and neighboring police jurisdictions. Sites are also required to work with the evaluation team
from RIT’s CPSI. The evaluation focuses on the fidelity of strategy implementation, the state
and local processes and trainings that support implementation, adaptations sites make to
strategies to fit local needs, and developing outcome measures regarding GIVE’s efficacy.
Importance of Theory in Criminal Justice Program Development
Criminology focuses on the causes of crime, whereas criminal justice studies the response
to crime. There is a much richer discourse regarding the former. Theorists often assume a
“rational model” of criminal justice, implying that there is no need to study criminal justice
actions because actions would simply align with what is known from criminology to reduce
crime (Duffee, 2015). There are reasons to doubt this assumption. Program evaluations often
find little or no effect on crime because of implementation problems. Further, research in other
fields has shown that “knowledge about how to improve behavioral health is not sufficient to
improve behavioral health” (Duffee, 2015, p. 17-18). Therefore, in addition to studying
criminological theory, it is important to study criminal justice agents and institutions.
Implementation researchers note that being “aware of the relevant theory… is more likely
to result in an effective intervention” (Stewart & Klein, 2016, p. 616). Implementation theories
can explain the processes by which a new intervention is successful or not. Nonetheless, Davies,
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Walker, and Grimshaw (2010) found that theories were explicitly used in less than a quarter of
studies that developed guideline and implementation strategies; when theory was used, “there
was poor justification of choice of intervention and use of theory” (p. 1).
This review will first discuss criminological theories that relate to GIVE and then
implementation theory. While criminological theory is of course beneficial, understanding
implementation theory is critical in examining whether GIVE is likely to reduce gun violence.
Relation of Selected Theoretical Perspectives to GIVE Components
This paper explicates four theoretical domains that relate to the implementation and
purpose of GIVE: subculture of violence, deterrence, rational choice and situational crime
prevention, and implementation theory. Table 1 displays which theoretical domain(s) are most
relevant to each GIVE strategy.
Table 1: Theoretical Domains Most Relevant to Each GIVE Strategy
Focused
Hot Spots
Deterrence Policing
Subculture of Violence
Deterrence

somewhat
X

Rational Choice/Situational
Crime Prevention
Implementation Theory

Street
CPTED POP Procedural
Outreach
Justice
X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

Subculture of Violence Theory
Subculture of violence theory draws on differential association theory to explain why
some groups experience and commit violence at higher rates, particularly dispute-related gun
violence among young, impoverished, African-American males (Cullen & Agnew, 2006). The
fundamental thesis is that some individuals hold “definitions” or a “code of the street” that
makes them see “violence as an appropriate, even required response to a wide range of
provocations” (Cullen & Agnew, 2006, p. 147). Anderson (1999) argues that persistent and
systemic racial discrimination, the de-industrialization of the US workforce, concentrated
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poverty, and the proliferation of guns and drugs has left residents of the most impoverished
inner-city communities with a profound sense of alienation from mainstream society. Many
residents believe that institutions such as police and schools have failed them and that they must
fend for themselves. They have developed a “code of the street” that determines rules of social
conduct in public spaces, built upon the notion of respect. Without conventional means to obtain
respect (e.g., fulfilling employment), respect is gained by displaying a tendency towards violence
for protection of self and loved ones as well as by acquiring material goods. The code also often
moderates violence by encouraging people to confront others only when it is deemed truly
necessary due to the likelihood that some individuals will escalate provocations to an extreme.
Anderson (1999) contends that for protection, most people in impoverished inner-city
communities must act and sometimes be violent, even if they are not fully invested in the code.
Those who deliver violence gain a violent reputation for this and gain safety and respect; others
are less willing to confront him. The code perpetuates, even demands, violent retaliation or
demonstrations of power in response to actions viewed as disrespectful so that others learn that
the person will not tolerate disrespect. Further, many individuals rely on the drug trade for their
livelihood. Threats to their business threaten their lifestyle and safety and must also be met with
force to regain or maintain respect. In communities where violence is common, people are more
apt to carry weapons, and guns are relatively easy to obtain. Combining this with the sale and
use of drugs adds to the volatility of public life in inner-city communities (Anderson, 1999;
Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1982/2006). One measure of respect and credibility is how many people
can be brought together to avenge a person, such as family or friends. Thus, families and groups
provide mutual protection to their members. When violence occurs between groups, members
feel they must avenge one another, and such feuds can continue for years (Anderson, 1999).
Compared to mainstream culture, violence is viewed as acceptable or required in a
broader range of events, but this subculture does not approve of violence in all situations. The
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subculture, in order to exist at all, must share some values with mainstream culture. People hold
subcultural values to varying degrees, dependent upon personality factors, age, life
circumstances, and home environment and learnings. The more a person assimilates subcultural
values, the number of kinds of situations in which he or she uses violence will increase
(Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1982/2006). Within certain inner-city communities, to respond
nonviolently to certain situations is to risk social isolation or victimization (Wolfgang &
Ferracuti, 1982/2006). Anderson (1999) argues, though, that all individuals living in such
communities, even those who do not hold violent subcultural values, must learn the code of the
street and abide by it in certain situations (particularly in public) or risk victimization. The
theory holds that subcultural values are learned through differential learning and differential
association (Cullen & Agnew, 2006). Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1982/2006) note that aggression
is behaviorally reinforced by the reward of inflicting pain and injury upon the victim and by
extrinsic rewards present in the subculture of violence for behaving in such ways (e.g., respect,
status, wealth, self-esteem, and protection). Further, since the violence is encouraged in certain
situations by the social code of conduct, perpetrators avoid feeling guilt, especially if the
violence is committed against others who hold these values.
Empirical evidence has found support for the subculture of violence theory, including the
mechanisms of socialization in gangs and commission of violence (Stretesky & Pogrebin, 2007)
and motivations for carrying weapons (Brennan & Moore, 2009). Empirical evidence has found
that “while race does not appear to be related to the subculture of violence, young people, males,
residents of deprived communities, Southerners, and possibly lower-class people my be more
likely to hold certain values conducive to violence” (Cullen & Agnew, 2006:147).
It is reasonable to try to prevent violence by deterring it with legal sanctions. Such efforts
are founded in rational choice and deterrence theories (discussed in more detail below) and
involve increasing the costs or decreasing benefits for engaging in violence. This is not entirely
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opposed to the subculture of violence thesis. However, deterrence efforts should recognize how
would-be offenders within a subculture of violence would weigh the risks and benefits of a
violent act. It must recognize the realistic ability of institutions of social control (e.g., police,
courts, and prisons) to effectively operate in these communities, as well as the perceived
legitimacy of such agencies, which is often sorely lacking in alienated communities.
Integration of the subculture of violence theory in GIVE. The subculture of violence
thesis is perhaps the best explanation for the violence that occurs in the GIVE sites with the most
violence. The subculture is an adaptation to stressors and macro-societal structural conditions,
developed and entrenched over time. Most gun violence occurs in impoverished areas of cities
with strong racial and economic segregation. Gun violence is perpetuated by very few
individuals in the most alienated pockets of the cities who form groups or gangs, and many feuds
began years ago. The vast majority of the shooters and victims are young black males. These
communities are described as abiding by a code of the street, though the degree of this varies
both within a city and across GIVE jurisdictions. In some GIVE sites, the subculture of violence
is arguably not present; violence is driven by other factors such as intoxication and domestic
problems and rarely escalates to the use of guns. Nonetheless, the cities in which the subculture
of violence is alive and well tend to account for the majority of gun violence in the state.
GIVE only directly acknowledges and addresses these conditions through street outreach
and procedural justice. Procedural justice, which is a set of principles that are to be integrated in
all GIVE efforts, recognizes, like subculture of violence theory, the profound alienation and lack
of trust that impoverished, urban, African-American communities have in criminal justice
agencies, which has led to the code of the street to govern public life. Legitimacy is increased if
criminal justice agents exercise authority in a procedurally just way. Quality of the decisionmaking process (fairness and neutrality) and the quality of treatment (courtesy and respect)
influence perceptions of procedural justice (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Meares, 2010).
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Street outreach much more directly aligns with subculture of violence theory. It involves
hiring individuals who are formerly part of the gang and/or violence subculture – ideally with
high street credibility – who have ceased violence and are working on being successful in
mainstream society. Street outreach uses a public health approach, recognizing that violence
spreads like a disease. Street outreach workers develop trusting relationships with those most atrisk for shooting or being shot, discourage them from using violence, and intervene in violent
disputes. They help resolve disputes in a way that maintains allegiance to the code but prevents
violence. This strategy draws on many elements of the subculture of violence thesis, recognizing
the importance of respect, credibility, and the rules of conduct that individuals in the subculture
feel are legitimate (Skogan, Harnett, Bump, & Dubois, 2009).
Rational Choice and Situational Crime Prevention Theories
Most GIVE strategies and much of the criminal justice system assume that individuals
choose to commit crimes, including violent crime and “offenses that [are] pathologically
motivated or impulsively executed,” after weighing the costs and benefits (Cornish & Clarke,
1980/2006, p. 422). In rational choice theory, an individual will engage in crime if the benefits
outweigh the costs. Individuals first consider other ways of meeting a need. The decision that
one is willing to commit crime in general is based on direct and vicarious personal learning and
experience (i.e., morals, view of self, and ability to plan and implement a plan), individual traits,
and social and demographic characteristics. Then, the individual must choose whether to commit
a particular crime in a given context. The factors considered will differ by situation and crime
type. Importantly, rational choice theory focuses on explaining criminal events rather than the
criminal disposition of offenders. The theory examines the “situational factors related to
opportunity, effort, and proximal risks” (Cornish & Clarke, 1986/2006, p. 424).
Building on this theory is situational crime prevention theory, which explicitly recognizes
environmental influences on criminal offending. Clarke (1980/2006) argues that situational
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crime prevention is far more practical for crime control than dispositional or “root cause”
theories of offending. Physical opportunities and the risks of being caught are the two categories
of situational factors that can be manipulated to prevent crime. A situational focus is needed to
understand why crime occurs in some places and circumstances and not in others.
Rational choice theory as applied to gun crime can be thought of as a series of decisions:
decisions to carry guns, to be in a setting where guns may be present, to pursue a dispute, to
show or threaten a gun, and to use a gun (Brennan & Moore, 2009). This is heavily influenced
by social forces and evaluations of risk, which in turn are related to youths’ developmental stage
and circumstances regarding their perceived life outcomes (which is also acknowledged by
subculture of violence theory). Personality traits, social impression management, and the social
group’s perspectives on violence all contribute to the decision. Researchers have also noted that
gun offenders learn and use scripts about violence involvement and may be more likely to decide
to commit gun violence because the youths lack other methods of resolving disputes (a key
component of rational choice theory). Various costs and benefits factor into each stage of the
decision to commit violence, many of which are influenced by the code of the street and
socioeconomic conditions. “Weapon use needs to be understood not just as a corollary of
violence, but as a behavior with its own dynamics, antecedents and consequences. Furthermore,
weapon use needs to be understood within the wider social context of deprivation and
subcultures of violence” (Brennan & Moore, 2009, p. 223).
Integration of Rational Choice/Situational Crime Prevention Theories in GIVE. The
most GIVE strategy most explicitly related to situational crime prevention is CPTED. In
CPTED, areas experiencing crime are assessed for environmental factors that (1) may contribute
to crime and (2) could be changed to increase the difficulty of crime commission or the risk of
being caught. By design, CPTED addresses surveillance, access control, territorial
reinforcement, and maintenance of target areas. However, in practice in GIVE sites, surveillance
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(cameras and improved lighting) and maintenance (general clean-up) receive the most attention,
partially due to the costs associated with access control (e.g., better locks, security guards, metal
detectors, etc.) and possibly because of the natural inclination of law enforcement towards
strategies that increase the likelihood of arrest (rather than prevent the commission of crime).
The focused deterrence strategy is related to rational choice theory in that it presents
violence-prone individuals with information that should factor into perceived costs for crime
both by communicating an informational deterrence message and through the process of
enforcement (which serves both specific and general deterrence, discussed more below). Hot
spots policing, in its most basic form, provides increased police surveillance to high-crime areas,
thus changing one of the key factors in an offenders’ decision to commit a crime. Street outreach
strategies align with rational choice theory because rational choice theory recognizes the role of
the person’s prior learning and experiences as well as the social factors of a situation when
deciding to engage in any crime, including violence. Street outreach strategies are designed
specifically to give people alternative options to committing violence.
POP and procedural justice are difficult to connect directly with rational choice and
situational crime prevention theories. POP is a broad method to analyze and solve problems;
thus, some of the interventions chosen will be related to these theories, but other strategies that
do not would certainly be acceptable under a POP framework. Procedural justice can only be
related in that offenders are influenced by their perceptions of criminal justice system legitimacy
in their weighing of the likelihood and impact of legal risks when considering violence.
Deterrence Theory
Deterrence theory shares the assumption with rational choice theory that individuals
choose actions that are most beneficial considering costs. However, deterrence theory is focused
on the application of legal sanctions to deter criminal behavior (Stafford & Warr, 1993/2006). It
is less concerned with social and environmental influences. Both specific deterrence (direct
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punishment for a crime) and general deterrence (knowing about the punishment of others) are
theorized to reduce crime. Deterrence work has also examined the swiftness, certainty, fairness,
and sometimes severity of punishment and rewards (Kleiman, 2016; Howe & Loftus, 1996).
Stafford and Warr (1993/2006) recognize that each individual has experiences with
general and specific punishment and with punishment avoidance that will affect perceptions of
the certainty and severity of punishment. “It is possible that punishment avoidance does more to
encourage crime than punishment does to discourage it. Offenders whose experience is limited
largely to avoiding punishment may come to believe that they are immune…, even in the face of
occasional evidence to the contrary” (Stafford & Warr, 1993/2006, p. 416-417).
There is significant empirical evidence that deterrence strategies can reduce gun violence.
The original evaluation of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, which evolved into the focused
deterrence model, found statistically significant reductions in shootings (Braga, Kennedy,
Waring, & Morrison Piehl, 2001). These results held in a future study that used more rigorous
propensity score matching of “treated” and “non-treated” gangs, and there were also significant
reductions in shootings by vicariously treated gangs (Braga, Hureau, & Papachristos, 2014).
Makarios and Pratt (2012) found that “the most effective programs combined both punitive and
supportive strategies to effectively reduce gun violence” (p. 238). Thus, deterrence strategies
can be strengthened by other approaches.
Integration of Deterrence Theory in GIVE. The concept of punishment avoidance is
clearly relevant to the high-violence urban areas, where crimes with little to no punishment are a
fact of life. In fact, assailants are arrested in only a small fraction of shooting incidents.
Therefore, while the main GIVE agencies are essentially formed on the basis of deterrence, there
is little reason to believe that the traditional effort to deliver legal punishment is effective. This
point is not lost on those implementing GIVE who bemoan their frequent inability to arrest,
incarcerate, or deter those committing serious crimes.

NYS GIVE’S ALIGNMENT WITH THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

20

Nonetheless, it appears that deterrence is the main operating strategy in GIVE. Because
the structures and belief systems in the criminal justice agencies align so readily with deterrence,
this is the most readily-implemented theory. Only a few GIVE strategies, however, directly align
with deterrence theory. Focused deterrence is the most clearly deterrence-based strategy. It
recognizes that a very small portion of individuals is almost always responsible for the vast
majority of gun violence in a jurisdiction, and these individuals are usually part of groups or
gangs. The strategy involves bringing these individuals to a session (or communicating with
them in the community) to deliver a deterrence and a support message. The individuals are given
a formal notification that members of the next group to commit violence will be met with the full
force of resources from all partnering criminal justice agencies. They encourage the individuals
present to spread this message among their groups. They offer social and support services to
help the individuals engage in more positive behavior. The strategy is dependent upon the
effective delivery of deterrence when violence occurs and support when requested. Groups that
commit violence and become the focus of law enforcement serve as examples for others (general
deterrence) (Braga et al., 2001). This strategy is clearly deterrence-based, but it recognizes the
important role of the social connections among groups and, to some degree, the socioeconomic
conditions under which serious violent offenders live. While the strategy, by design, effectively
addresses the swiftness, certainty, and fairness of punishment (fairness by explaining to people
exactly what will happen if violence is committed), it is rare for this to actually occur in practice
in GIVE sites, perhaps due to the degree of change needed in the legal system(s) to have
agencies act swiftly and with certainty in full accordance with this model.
Hot spots policing also generally holds to a deterrence framework, at least in practice in
GIVE sites. Crime tends to occur in small geographical areas, and geographical patterns persist
over time. Hot spots policing focuses resources on such areas both for deterrence and to change
the underlying conditions that are believed to be contributing to the persistence of crime (Braga
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& Weisburd, 2010). In practice, hot spots policing often feels to police agencies like what they
have always done (go to where the crime is), but the strategy by design promotes a much deeper
problem-solving effort in hot spot areas. When in hot spot areas, officers generally engage in
surveillance, gather information, and work to improve communication with the community, but
this is often done with the primary goal of eventually arresting those involved in gun crimes. It
is common for GIVE sites to focus police resources, attention, and time in hot spot areas, hoping
that increased presence will increase the likelihood (or at least perceptions of the likelihood) of
being caught, therefore deterring crime.
CPTED, as noted above, is more akin to situational crime prevention and rational choice
theory than it is a deterrence strategy, at least by design. In implementation, however, most
GIVE agencies utilize CPTED as another arm of deterrence. Instead of changing underlying
environmental conditions that contribute to crime, most GIVE sites increase surveillance and
close get-away paths to increase the likelihood of arrest. Many GIVE sites clean up lots in hot
spot areas, secure vacant housing, and so on, but these efforts are rarely directly connected to
causes of violent crime; rather, they address “eye-sores” and deter low-level crime like drug use
and loitering. Only in the areas with the most severe gun violence do CPTED strategies directly
connect to the violence (e.g., removing shrubbery in which gangs hide drugs and guns).
Implementation Theory
As can be seen from the discussion so far, GIVE strategies pertain in some ways to
deterrence, rational choice, and subculture of violence theories. GIVE overall, at both the state
coordination and site activity levels, is also informed by implementation theory. Implementation
science studies the processes by which intended changes to everyday practice are integrated into
sustained routine (May, 2013). Its application to criminal justice is still in its infancy.
Implementation theory draws from organizational and network theories to understand the
social processes and contexts in which implementation occurs. Agency theory, for instance, “is a
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general model of social relations involving the delegation of authority” and how the authority
figure controls those tasked with implementation (Kiser, 1999, p. 146). It is derived from
rational choice theory but recognizes that action is not always strictly “rational” in traditional
economic terms of increasing cost effectiveness and efficiency; some actions are based on
morality, integrity, desires for power, and other cultural determinants. Because implementers’
interests are often different from those of the authority figure, agency theory also examines
monitoring mechanisms and sanctions and incentives to promote implementation.
Successful implementers generally are not so risk-averse that they resist change; have the
ability and resources to act effectively; and are dependent upon the authority promoting the
intervention. The more resources the implementer has besides those provided by the authority,
the more challenging the implementation will be to control. Agencies will also be more likely to
implement a strategy if they believe the authority figure is legitimate. It is also particularly
challenging to monitor and control those with expert knowledge. In these cases, personal staffs
are often appointed as an intermediary form of control and are “selected on the basis of personal
ties and loyalty; they are usually dependent on the [political leader], and if all else fails they can
be sanctioned severely and arbitrarily” (Kiser, 1999, p. 159). Overall, compliance can be
increased through monitoring and sanctions or by promoting beliefs in legitimacy (Kiser, 1999).
May (2013) creates a general theory of implementation to explain the social processes
involved in implementation. Implementation is a process rather than an outcome and involves
material, cognitive, and social processes. Individual and collective actions are pragmatic,
strategic responses to circumstances as well as expressions of commitment to values (or lack
thereof). Practices are operationalized through coherence (shared beliefs), cognitive participation
(who does what), collective action (what they do), and reflexive monitoring (how outcomes are
assessed) (Stewart & Klein, 2016). Incorporating a complex intervention in a social system
“depends on agents’ capacity to cooperate and coordinate their actions” (May, 2013, p. 6).
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Organizational readiness “is a shared psychological state in which people are committed to
change and confident they can do it” (May, 2013, p. 6). One must consider how much agency
members value the change and their perceptions of capability, which is in turn informed by their
perception of task demands, resources, and a history of making change.
In summary, an intervention is most likely to be normalized into practice (1) “if its
elements, and their associated cognitive and behavioral ensembles can be… integrated in
everyday practice;” (2) “if the social system… provides normative and relational capacity” to
bring about change; (3) “if agents both individually intend and collectively share a commitment
to operationalizing it;”and (4) “if agents invest in operationalizing it” (May, 2013, p. 5-9).
Implementation Theory Applied to Criminal Justice. While general models of
networks can be helpful in interpreting agency actions, there are unique features of criminal
justice agencies that warrant special attention. Snipes and Maguire (2015) note that criminal
justice theory, “the study of the official response to behavior that may be labeled criminal,” is
still in its infancy (p. 33). While the various criminal justice agencies are interdependent in some
ways, they have “separate but related duties and goals” (Snipes & Maguire, 2015, p. 29). As
noted above (Kiser, 1999), individuals employed by agencies can have goals that differ from
organizational goals. Criminal justice employees frequently interact with people from other
agencies. Such “informal linkages are often much stronger than the formal linkages,” and people
will work together for mutual convenience (Snipes & Maguire, 2015, p. 30).
Institutional theory pertains to “how an organization’s environment… influences its
operations, structures, and service delivery” (Renauer, 2015, p. 121). For example, a grant
encourages agencies to at least symbolically adopt a strategy, but it does not ensure actual
implementation. Grants are effective coercive forces because rational organizational leaders will
try to maintain the funding. Agency structures and routines are a response to the various forces
at work on an agency and can indicate the degree of implementation. In general, “at its core, the
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organization lacks commitment to… changes and responds by adopting symbolic or ceremonial
structures, policies, and practices” (Snipes & Maguire, 2015, p. 38). Criminal justice agencies
often “refract” strategies to fit their local context. “The organization rarely adapts to the
intended changes but rather adapts the change to the department” (Renauer, 2015, p. 123).
Renauer (2015) identifies three relationship networks that support or constrain change:
centrist (between state and local agencies), local (among politicians, government agencies,
businesses, and resident groups), and internal police department (among the chief, city executive,
unions, and police culture). “Each relationship network simultaneously influences the range of
operational choices a police department can engage in by exerting mimetic, normative, or
coercive institutionalizing forces” (Renauer, 2015, p. 126). Mimetic forces involve mimicking
other organizations to maintain organizational legitimacy, often resulting in symbolic adoption.
Normative forces encourage departments to adopt structures, policies, and behaviors that align
with what others deem as appropriate goals and activities. Coercive forces relate to an agency’s
ability to monitor conformity and reward or sanction behavior. A grant will be more coercive if
it forms a larger part of the department’s total budget, if guidance and training are provided, if
the goals and strategies are clear, and if oversight mechanisms are strong.
Dearing (2009) examines dissemination of evidence-based practices through the lens of
diffusion of innovation theory. First, those who choose to adopt a strategy usually have higher
authority than those who will implement it, and authority figures do not often know how well the
program is being implemented. Indeed, “implementers often subvert or contradict the intention
of adopters” (Dearing, 2009, p. 504; Kiser, 2009). True adoption will occur if the strategy is
perceived to be advantageous, low in complexity, compatible with established methods, has
observable processes and outcomes, and does not require immediate full adoption. While
knowledge can be transmitted from central authority figures, persuasion regarding the merits and
implementation of the intervention occurs through channels of social influence, led by opinion
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leaders who are not generally authority figures. These leaders can be identified and informed or
trained, and their natural, existing channels of influence will promote diffusion of the innovation.
Senior management must also support implementation because staff time will be required.
Several common mistakes in strategy dissemination are directly relevant to GIVE. “We
assume that evidence matters in the decision making of potential adopters,” “introduce
interventions before they are ready,” “assume that information will influence decision making,”
“confuse authority with influence,” and “fail to distinguish among change agents, authority
figures, opinion leaders, and innovation champions” (Dearing, 2009, p. 509). He notes that
offering a choice of interventions to potential adopters, like GIVE does, improves
implementation quality because people cherish the right to choose. He cautions that “adopters
are more likely to select an intervention that is readily compatible with their organizational
context” (Dearing, 2009, p. 510). However, once one intervention is adopted, the agency is
usually more willing to adopt another.
“Adherents of program fidelity believe that working to insure that adopters make as few
modifications as possible is key to retaining the success of the original program,” while
“adherents of the program adaptation perspective [like May (2013)] counter that it is only
through allowing adopters to change a program to suit their needs that the likelihood of
sustainability is increased” (Dearing, 2009, p. 514). Aspects of both the work environment and
the intervention should be altered in implementation. Successful implementation is more likely
if adopters understand which aspects of the intervention are critical and which can be changed.
Such modifications can make the change more sustainable (May, 2013).
Implementation Theory Applied to GIVE. GIVE draws on implementation theory and
theories about agency relations and operations. GIVE funds changes to how criminal justice
agencies prevent and respond to shootings. Agencies resist change for many reasons (Dearing,
2009; May, 2013). From the start, DCJS built in systems to monitor and support implementation
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with state staff and a third-party evaluator. They provide training and technical assistance and
designate liaisons at each site. While it is possible that communicating with authority figures
may be effective in a hierarchical law enforcement agency, effective implementation is most
likely if implementers believe the authority is legitimate, if they are dependent on the authority,
and if the authority is an opinion leader (Kiser, 1999; Dearing, 2009). This research examines
how well GIVE practices at state and local levels align with implementation theory.
Research Purpose
The goal of this research is to examine the extent to which GIVE, in design and
implementation, aligns with theories of subculture of violence, deterrence, rational choice,
situational crime prevention, and implementation. Deterrence theory as applied to GIVE focuses
on increasing the consequences of gun violence. Rational choice and situational crime
prevention theories attempt to increase the cost and decrease the benefits of committing crime
and alter the environmental conditions to do so. Approaches that integrate the subculture of
violence note that those who abide by the code of the street use violence because their honor
depends on it, and they do not feel the police are legitimate. Implementation theory recognizes
that pre-existing organizational goals and structures and the local environment will influence
how strategies are implemented. While these theories can all be applied to the problem of gun
violence, they are not necessarily consistent with one another in assumptions or application.
In this research, I will examine whether the design of GIVE is consistent with the theories
presented here, focusing on the internal consistency (or lack thereof) among the theoretical
domains. I will also examine the degree to which the criminal justice agencies tasked with
implementing GIVE follow each of these theories or if they prioritize other organizational goals
and interests. I predict that deterrence will be emphasized in GIVE strategy implementation
regardless of the strategy because police departments specifically and the criminal justice system
generally is already built upon deterrence. Rational choice theory and situational crime
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prevention will have the next level of influence to the degree that they align well with law
enforcement functions. Efforts that draw on subculture of violence theory will largely be
excluded from strategy choice and implementation, even though they likely best explain the
nature of urban violence, because the agencies tasked with implementing GIVE are not welldesigned to address the constructs identified in this theory. Nonetheless, there are ways that
GIVE encourages jurisdictions to consider aspects of subculture of violence theory. Finally,
findings from implementation science inform the causal mechanisms by which these strategies
come to be implemented in GIVE sites in various forms. Insights from implementation theories
will help to explain how and why the goals of GIVE differ from actual implementation. The
research will also comment on the theoretical consistency among these strategies and between
these strategies and the principles of procedural justice and POP, a key aspect of GIVE’s design.
Discussion and Conclusion
GIVE is an innovative initiative to reduce gun violence through the use of an array of
evidence-based strategies by law enforcement and community-based agencies. The state-level
design of GIVE as well as the local-level implementation of the strategies align in different ways
with subculture of violence theory, deterrence theory, rational choice theory, situational crime
prevention theory, and implementation theory. The rich evaluation data (both quantitative and
qualitative) provide insight into how different sites’ align with these theories in principle and in
practice. The methods described in the next paper will help to illustrate the challenges and
successes of the GIVE initiative in addressing gun violence.

NYS GIVE’S ALIGNMENT WITH THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

28

Chapter 3: Methods and Instrumentation
This paper describes the data collection and analysis methods for an examination of how
well the GIVE initiative aligns with several theoretical perspectives. It also describes how the
data was originally collected for the purposes of the GIVE evaluation. CPSI received a grant
from NYS DCJS to evaluate the GIVE program beginning in July 2014, and the evaluation is
ongoing. The scope of the evaluation and the data collection and analysis methods changed over
time to meet the needs of the evolving program. Only the methods and data from calendar year
2016 are described here.
Grouping of GIVE Sites for Analysis
Two of the seventeen GIVE counties have two distinct implementation efforts in
different cities, so there are nineteen total sites. Because CPSI is the Monroe County GIVE’s
research partner, this site is evaluated by a third party and is not included in this analysis. Sites
are grouped as having high shooting rates, medium shooting rates, low shooting rates, little to no
shootings, and large geographies. Analysis compares sites within and among these groups.
Data Collection Procedure
The GIVE evaluation is mixed-methods, with qualitative data coded into quantitative
ratings on several instruments designed by the evaluators. During 2016, evaluators held monthly
phone calls and quarterly site visits with each GIVE site.2 Semi-structured interview topics were
tailored to each interview to understand implementation. Questions were based on who would
be interviewed, gaps in knowledge, and known changes to strategies. Phone call topics were
provided to interviewees in advance of the calls so they could obtain needed information. Notes
were taken by all present evaluators. Interviewees would vary by site and by month. In most
cases, the liaison was present. Others were often targeted for interviewing to fill in knowledge

2

One of two evaluators was assigned as the lead for each GIVE site. Phone calls were prepared for, scheduled,
and led by the lead evaluator, and the other evaluator attended the actual call. For most sites, only the lead
evaluator conducted site visits. Both evaluators attended site visits for the five largest sites.
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gaps or to speak to representatives of a funded partner agency that has not been interviewed
recently. Unfunded partners or those with small and unchanging roles were interviewed as
needed. In general, evaluators focused on one strategy on each call as well as on changes to
other strategies or personnel, funding, politics, etc. Calls lasted fifteen to sixty minutes.
Evaluators used site visits to witness GIVE implementation and to conduct more in-depth
interviews.3 Most GIVE work happens in planning meetings or spontaneously in response to
violence. This made observation difficult to schedule, so some site visits only consisted of
interviews. Site visits would last between two and eight hours. Appendix A includes examples of
interview topics for monthly calls and example site visit itineraries and topics.
Description of Instruments, Measures, and Coding
Each month, both evaluators reviewed the notes and rated the site on three instruments.4
Evaluators compared ratings, discussed discrepancies, and decided on final ratings. There are
monthly ratings for each site on each instrument from January through August 2016. For the last
quarter of 2016, ratings were completed quarterly due to low monthly variation and the
difficulties addressing all instrument items sufficiently each month. Data was collected as
described above for each of the three months, but ratings were done using all three months’ data.
Also, the instruments were reduced from a total of 153 items to 88 items in September 2016 after
statistical analyses of item redundancy. The revised instruments are available upon request.
The Implementation Assessment Review (IAR) has been used since the start of GIVE to
monitor key aspects of implementation, such as leadership, organization, partner integration, and
data use. Nine items are rated from one to four, with higher ratings indicating higher quality.
Strategy checklists note the presence or absence of strategy components (coded as one or
zero, respectively). There are checklists for focused deterrence, hot spots policing, CPTED, and
3
4

Observing implementation was accomplished by attending required monthly meetings of GIVE partners, by
getting tours of the city’s hot spot and CPTED areas, observing focused deterrence call-ins, attending policecommunity relations events, or attending strategy planning meetings.
A formal scoring guide was developed and finalized in September 2016.
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street outreach, each of which includes items about procedural justice and POP integration. The
number of items on each checklist differs, so the total rating is a percentage of items present.
The fidelity and dosage rubric captures strategy quality. The same rubric is used for each
strategy. Strategies are assessed on a 1-4 scale in one area (intensity) to measure dosage and in
four areas to measure fidelity (adherence, quality of delivery, participant responsiveness, and
adaptation). The fidelity rating is the four areas averaged and rounded to the nearest integer.
Analysis Plan
The goal of this research is to examine how well the GIVE initiative aligns with several
theoretical perspectives: subculture of violence, deterrence, rational choice, situational crime
prevention, and implementation theories. Descriptive statistics of the instrument ratings (mean,
median, range, and standard deviation) will be presented by site group for the last available data
point (September-December 2016). The descriptive statistics will be shown for the total strategy
checklist scores for each strategy, each area of the fidelity/dosage rubrics for each strategy, and
each item on the IAR. This data will aid in comparisons among and within groups.
Implementation theory perspectives can be ascertained from many instrument item
ratings because the instruments were all designed to measure implementation in some ways. All
IAR items pertain to implementation and will be reviewed closely. Other items that relate to
implementation theory are the intensity, quality of delivery, participant responsiveness, and
adaptation areas of the fidelity/dosage rubric. These capture how the sites chose to implement
each strategy, including their enthusiasm and belief in strategies. Quantitative ratings will be
supplemented by summaries of qualitative information from interviews in which strategy
organization, leadership, principles, and buy-in were discussed. Themes will be extracted from
such discussions to compare and contrast site groups. Historical information regarding statelevel implementation support will elucidate some aspects of implementation theory.

NYS GIVE’S ALIGNMENT WITH THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

31

The strategy checklists and fidelity/dosage rubrics on street outreach provide the most
insight into sites’ perspectives on subculture of violence theory. Qualitative themes will be
gleaned from 2016 site visit and phone call interviews regarding the street outreach strategy or
other discussions of culture and the social environment of violent groups (such as when asking
site representatives to describe the nature of their group violence).
To examine perspectives on deterrence theory, descriptive statistics by site group will be
shown for the focused deterrence total strategy checklist rating and each fidelity/dosage rubric
item. Qualitative data pertaining to deterrence, such as increasing arrests, prosecution, sanctions,
and other legal strategies to decrease crime, will be summarized. Only interviews where such
efforts were described in detail, including the sites’ philosophy and methods, will be used.
Finally, data regarding CPTED will yield the most information regarding rational choice
and situational crime prevention theory. In most sites, this was intertwined with hot spots
policing efforts. Items to be examined include the strategy checklists and fidelity/dosage rubrics
for hot spots and CPTED. Qualitative themes will be drawn from discussions related to
environmental factors that contribute to violence and other non-criminal justice methods to make
commission of gun crime more difficult.
Methodology Critique and Limitations
The original data collection and evaluation effort for GIVE faced numerous challenges.
Evaluators have had to modify methods and instruments over time to meet changing needs and
learnings. Each GIVE site uses different strategies and different partners, and strategies are
always at different stages of implementation across sites and even within one site. These
challenges made it inefficient to ask the same questions each month or to each site. The
interview protocols had to be more flexible, but this limits their analytical strength. Although
systematic analysis is not possible on such data, examining themes should illustrate consistencies
and diversity among sites related to the research questions.
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A serious limitation is that different people in a site have different perspectives on
strategy implementation, but not everyone could be interviewed every month. Efforts were made
to interview all relevant individuals periodically. There were also times when data could not be
collected, usually due to scheduling conflicts or consistent nonresponse from a liaison. The latter
was mitigated by gathering information from other representatives. In the former case, during
the next contact with the site, evaluators noted the timing of changes and completed ratings for
the missing month. This issue decreased with moving to quarterly ratings.
These limitations affect the present analysis as well, especially the fact that the interviews
and instruments were designed with a different purpose from the present study. The analysis
requires repurposing and reinterpreting some data. For instance, strategy checklists only note the
presence or absence of strategy components, but the percentage of present items by strategy as
well as which items were present lend insight into the sites’ theoretical bases for implementation
and their buy-in for particular strategies and components. Conclusions are supplemented with
descriptive information of their perspectives. Nonetheless, it is not always straightforward to
map specific items onto specific research questions when doing this secondary data analysis. It
is also worth reiterating that all instruments were designed by the CPSI evaluation team and have
not been thoroughly tested for validity and reliability.5 All conclusions should be made and
interpreted with caution, and caution is warranted for performing statistical analyses.

5

Some testing was done to eliminate duplicative items from the set of instruments. The shortened instruments
were used beginning in September 2016, and the quantitative data shown here is from these shortened
instruments.
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Chapter 4: Results
This research examines how well the GIVE initiative aligns with four theoretical domains
(described in earlier papers). This paper summarizes the findings from the qualitative analysis,
supplemented by evaluation rating information, as described in the previous methods paper.
Subculture of Violence Theory
Subcultures of violence in GIVE sites. The first question when applying the subculture
of violence theory to GIVE is whether subcultures of violence exist in the GIVE sites. Overall,
when representatives described the types of gun violence in their jurisdictions, less than a third
described a situation as extreme as described in the subculture of violence theory. Evaluators
periodically asked site representatives to describe the types and trends of group violence and
other initiatives in inner-city areas to address poverty and violence; the qualitative information
here is drawn from such conversations. The most common interview theme that connected to the
subculture of violence theory was that the violence in all GIVE sites tended to occur in the
jurisdictions’ most impoverished areas among young African-American males.
The three sites in Group H (with the highest gun violence rates) and the two sites in
Group C (with county-level GIVE programs) appear to have many of the features of a subculture
of violence. Site representatives routinely talked about serious gun violence perpetuated by only
a few gangs in their areas, and only a few members of those gangs were responsible for most of
the gun violence. These groups and individuals were the primary targets of focused deterrence,
street outreach, and, to a lesser degree, hot spots policing and CPTED efforts.
The other GIVE sites that seemed to lack a strong subculture of violence sometimes had
indications of a milder form of this subculture. A theme expressed (in almost all sites) that
relates to the subculture of violence was the “no snitching” mentality. Law enforcement
personnel often discussed this with a tone of frustration, since the communities’ resistance to
cooperating with law enforcement to address violence made law enforcement efforts far more
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complicated. Some representatives recognized this as a symptom of the communities’ alienation
and histories of mistrust with mainstream society and police. Rarely, representatives went so far
to say that they recognized that the criminal justice system had failed these communities. Many
sites talked about the “no snitching” mentality as a fact, and they adjusted their strategies to not
rely on community involvement (e.g., by installing more police cameras).
Most of the gun violence in the small- and medium-sized GIVE sites (Groups L and M)
was situational. It tended to be related to drug sales and group conflicts, but such conflicts did
not sustain or get as violent as those experienced by sites in Groups H and C. Still, several sites
did not seem to have a subculture of violence at all. Sites in Group A, which had so little gun
violence that they focused on aggravated assaults, had violence characterized by random
incidents, domestic violence, and bar- and alcohol-related fights. Guns were rarely used.
Therefore, the subculture of violence theory appears to only be directly applicable to the
GIVE sites with the highest rates of violence or those with pockets of very high violence where
such subcultures most likely do dictate social interactions as described in the theory. Despite
most GIVE sites lacking this subculture or having a mild form of it, the theory should still be
informative to GIVE implementers in some ways. The theory recognizes the impoverishment
and alienation of certain communities from mainstream culture and how this leads to selfpolicing, alternative methods to find respect, and ultimately to violence. It seems as if GIVE
strategies would be enhanced by more fully recognizing the situational and social conditions that
lead to violence in a particular context as well as the long-term historical conditions that have led
to such alienation and social proclivities towards violence.
Integration of subculture of violence theory into GIVE strategies. The street outreach
strategy is the most directly-aligned GIVE strategy with subculture of violence thesis. Only
about half of the GIVE sites actively use this strategy, although most stated that they would use it
so are rated on the evaluation instruments for this strategy. As shown in Table 2 below, sites in
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Groups M and A received the lowest average ratings on both the strategy checklist and the
fidelity and dosage rubric, while the sites with the highest levels of violence (Group H) adhered
the best to the strategy.
The street outreach programs in GIVE sites were operated by non-profits, and they were
expected to partner with local law enforcement for staff background checks, identification of
target geographical areas, and learning from law enforcement about violent incidents as soon as
possible. The strategy is to hire credible messengers who have lived a life within the subculture
of violence but no longer engage in drugs and violence. These outreach workers build
relationships with area youth and try to learn about and intervene in violent disputes. They often
help youth desist from gangs. This strategy aligns with the subculture of violence thesis in
recognizing the cultural conditions that lead to violence, especially the notion of respect.
In practice in GIVE sites, most sites with thriving street outreach programs struggled to
narrow their target area, to hire reliable staff who did not re-engage in the subcultural lifestyle, to
manage staff time to target only those at highest risk of violence, and to have resources to offer
tangible alternatives to gun violence and drug selling. Conversations with GIVE representatives
revealed the tension between the programs and law enforcement, even in the most cooperative
sites. Both partners, in general, tended to distrust one another and felt they had somewhat
differing goals. The most successful street outreach programs had law enforcement and program
personnel who understood the others’ role in reaching the same goal, but this was rare.
Although most GIVE sites selected this strategy, less than half truly implement a street
outreach program as per the Cure Violence model. Some use slight variations on this model.
Some sites seem to completely misunderstand what street outreach is and use a small non-profit
agency or law enforcement personnel to do general community relationship-building. Such
efforts do not tend to integrate concepts from the subculture of violence theory; they rather
emphasize choice and encouraging the community to inform law enforcement about violence.
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Table 2: All Evaluation Instrument Item Ratings for Street Outreach Strategy by Site Group

Group
H

M

L

A

C

All Sites

Stat
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N

SO
SO
SO
SO
Rubric:
Rubric:
SO
Strategy Strategy
SO
Quality
Partner
Fidelity SO Fidelity
Checklist Checklist
Rubric:
SO Rubric: of
Respon- SO Rubric: Rubric Rubric
Total
Percentage Intensity Adherence Delivery siveness Adaptation Total
Percentage
9.67
74.4%
3.00
3.33
3.33
4.00
3.67 14.33
89.6%
10.00
76.9%
3.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
4.00 14.00
87.5%
0.58
4.4%
0.00
0.58
0.58
0.00
0.58
1.53
9.5%
9.00
69.2%
3.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
3.00 13.00
81.3%
10.00
76.9%
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00 16.00
100.0%
1.00
7.7%
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
3.00
18.8%
3
3
3
3
3
2.75
21.2%
1.50
1.75
1.50
1.75
1.75
6.75
42.2%
1.00
7.7%
1.00
1.50
1.50
1.50
2.00
7.00
43.8%
4.19
32.3%
1.00
0.96
0.58
0.96
0.50
2.63
16.4%
0.00
0.0%
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.00
25.0%
9.00
69.2%
3.00
3.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
9.00
56.3%
9.00
69.2%
2.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
5.00
31.3%
4
4
4
4
4
10.00
76.9%
2.75
3.25
2.75
3.25
2.75 12.00
75.0%
9.50
73.1%
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.50
3.00 12.00
75.0%
2.16
16.6%
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.96
0.50
1.63
10.2%
8.00
61.5%
2.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
2.00 10.00
62.5%
13.00
100.0%
3.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
3.00 14.00
87.5%
5.00
38.5%
1.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
4.00
25.0%
4
4
4
4
4
8.00
61.5%
2.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
9.00
56.3%
8.00
61.5%
2.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
9.00
56.3%
8.00
8.00
0.00

61.5%
61.5%
0.0%

9.00
9.00
2.83
7.00
11.00
4.00

69.2%
69.2%
21.8%
53.8%
84.6%
30.8%

7.57
9.00
4.01
0.00
13.00
13.00

58.2%
69.2%
30.9%
0.0%
100.0%
100.0%

2.00
2.00
0.00
1
2.00
2.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
2
2.29
2.50
0.83
1.00
3.00
2.00
14

2.00
2.00
0.00
1
3.00
3.00
1.41
2.00
4.00
2.00
2
2.71
3.00
0.99
1.00
4.00
3.00
14

2.00
2.00
0.00
1
2.50
2.50
0.71
2.00
3.00
1.00
2
2.43
2.50
0.85
1.00
4.00
3.00
14

3.00
3.00
0.00
1
2.50
2.50
0.71
2.00
3.00
1.00
2
2.86
3.00
1.10
1.00
4.00
3.00
14

2.00
2.00
0.00
1
1.50
1.50
0.71
1.00
2.00
1.00
2
2.43
2.00
0.94
1.00
4.00
3.00
14

9.00
9.00
0.00

56.3%
56.3%
0.0%

9.50
9.50
3.54
7.00
12.00
5.00

59.4%
59.4%
22.1%
43.8%
75.0%
31.3%

10.43
11.00
3.50
4.00
16.00
12.00

0.65
0.69
0.22
0.25
1.00
0.75

Sites tended to poorly integrate street outreach strategies into the overall GIVE strategy and
failed to see the benefit of having such a strategy purposefully supplement other GIVE strategies.
Therefore, compared to other GIVE strategies, sites did not have as much buy-in and tended to
invest few resources into street outreach. This is revealed in the SO Rubric: Intensity column in
Table 2, which shows that no sites managed to achieve the highest rating for delivering enough
intervention to match the violence problem. Only the three sites in Group H, three of the four
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sites in Group L, and one of the two sites in Group C made conscious, frequent efforts to build
partnerships among law enforcement and street outreach programs and to integrate the strategy
into GIVE. (See the SO Rubric: Partner Responsiveness column in Table 2.)
The other way that GIVE most reflects a recognition of the subculture of violence thesis
is the effort to integrate procedural justice principles into all GIVE strategies. Both subculture of
violence theory and procedural justice recognize the profound alienation of inner-city
communities from mainstream society in general and from the police in particular. In practice,
though, GIVE sites struggled to understand procedural justice and to integrate its principles into
their everyday work. Site representatives frequently spoke of their lack of understanding about
how to implement these principles, and many felt they understood it as police-community
relations but failed to see the deeper aspects of the principles. Whereas procedural justice would
encourage attention be paid to the criminal justice systems and processes to which individuals
and communities are subject, interviews with GIVE representatives generally tried to integrate
procedural justice by doing community outreach and education about law enforcement functions
or simply holding listening sessions with the community.
Some sites trained officers in basic procedural justice principles, but conversations
revealed that officers often interpreted this as asking them to be kind and respectful towards
people, which they felt they already do, particularly “when people deserve it.” The trainings
rarely went deeper than this. However, one site in Group L invested tremendous resources in
officer training on various procedural justice-related topics, and this site and one in Group H
made conscious efforts to integrate the principles throughout their strategies. They tended to
recognize more than their colleagues the paradigm shift that procedural justice demands.
Many GIVE representatives felt that the deterrence message delivered at focused
deterrence call-ins about how the GIVE partners would respond to violence supported procedural
justice principles of transparency and fairness. Its failure, however, to also integrate listening to
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those affected and changing processes that may be seen as harsh or unfair undermines this effort,
from the perspective of evaluators.
The IAR and hot spots policing strategy checklist and fidelity ratings also revealed that
very few sites successfully integrated community partners into problem-solving around gun
violence. While GIVE representatives may recognize the many societal and community forces at
play as explicated in the subculture of violence theory, they rarely made substantive efforts to
address such conditions. For instance, they recognized that an individual’s failure to respond to
certain provocations could put him or her at risk of social isolation and victimization, but most
strategies focused on trying to get people to choose not to be violent or to cooperate with law
enforcement. There seemed to be a lack of creativity about how to tackle the entrenched
problems in the communities experiencing the most serious violence.
Rational Choice, Situational Crime Prevention, and Deterrence
The two theoretical domains of rational choice/situational crime prevention and of
deterrence theory are discussed together here because many of the concepts are connected in
GIVE implementation. Rational choice theory states that individuals engage in crime if the
benefits outweigh the costs and they perceive a lack of viable alternatives. Deterrence theory
emphasizes the role of legal sanctions in increasing the risks and decreasing the benefits of
crime. These principles are easily integrated into most GIVE strategies and align well with preexisting law enforcement practices. In interviews, these concepts were more readily articulable
and effectively translated into implementation compared to subculture of violence concepts.
Rational choice and situational crime prevention concepts were readily apparent in all
GIVE-menu strategy, but they were most relevant in CPTED and hot spots policing,. These
strategies were often intertwined because CPTED was implemented in hot spot areas.
Deterrence concepts were most obvious when personnel discussed the focused deterrence
strategy but also were very much present in CPTED and hot spots policing discussions as well.
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Interviews revealed that GIVE personnel frequently designed strategies to increase the
risk of being caught – either by being seen by other residents or by law enforcement – with the
goal of arrest. Hot spot patrols were the most common GIVE strategies across all sites. They
assigned officers to hot spot areas at times when violence tended to occur for targeted patrols.
Officer activities typically included low-level crime enforcement to prevent more serious crimes,
responding more quickly to violence, and patrolling or gathering intelligence about targeted
individuals or locations. For the smallest sites with the lowest levels of violence (Group A), such
patrols were infrequent and only implemented in response to intelligence and crime analysis that
indicated violence was likely on a given day and time. Visibility was a goal of hot spots patrols.
Some sites directly noted that this increases general deterrence (if, for example, individuals
watch others be arrested for engaging in violence) as well as the perceived likelihood of being
caught. Others expressed a goal of simply disrupting the daily routines of gangs/groups selling
drugs, increasing the amount of effort the individuals would need to expend in order to continue
committing crimes in that area. Another way to view this in situational crime prevention terms is
decreasing the opportunity to commit crime in general and violence in particular. All of these
activities align well with the normal functioning of law enforcement, and Table 3 below shows
that sites across all groups except Group A implemented almost all of the components of the hot
spots strategy listed on the strategy checklist.
While hot spots policing, by design, encourages a thorough analysis of the crime problem
and the use of broad community interventions, sites generally ignored these components and
preferred to assign additional law enforcement resources to hot spot areas for a deterrence effect.
It is important to note that broader community efforts could be in line with rational choice theory
because it could potentially result in gun-involved individuals being better connected to
mainstream society and having “more to lose” for engaging in violence, thereby increasing the
risks of engaging in crime. While this idea was discussed in a few GIVE sites, it rarely, if ever,
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Table 3: All Evaluation Instrument Item Ratings for the Hot Spots Strategy by Site Group

Group
H

M

L

A

C

All Sites

Stat
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N

Hot Spots
Hot Spots Hot Spots
Hot Spots Rubric:
Hot Spots Hot Spots
Strategy Strategy
Hot Spots Hot Spots Rubric:
Partner
Hot Spots Rubric
Rubric
Checklist Checklist
Rubric:
Rubric:
Quality of ResponRubric:
Fidelity
Fidelity
Total
Percentage Intensity Adherence Delivery
siveness Adaptation Total
Percentage
11.33
81.0%
3.33
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.33
15.33
95.8%
12.00
85.7%
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.00
15.00
93.8%
2.08
14.9%
0.58
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.58
0.58
3.6%
9.00
64.3%
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.00
15.00
93.8%
13.00
92.9%
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
16.00
100.0%
4.00
28.6%
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
6.3%
3
3
3
3
3
12.25
87.5%
3.50
3.50
3.25
3.75
2.50
13.00
81.3%
12.00
85.7%
3.50
4.00
3.00
4.00
2.00
13.00
81.3%
1.50
10.7%
0.58
1.00
0.50
0.50
1.00
2.45
15.3%
11.00
78.6%
3.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
10.00
62.5%
14.00
100.0%
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
16.00
100.0%
3.00
21.4%
1.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
6.00
37.5%
4
4
4
4
4
13.25
94.6%
3.25
4.00
3.50
4.00
3.00
14.50
90.6%
13.50
96.4%
3.00
4.00
3.50
4.00
3.00
14.50
90.6%
0.96
6.8%
0.50
0.00
0.58
0.00
0.00
0.58
3.6%
12.00
85.7%
3.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
3.00
14.00
87.5%
14.00
100.0%
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.00
15.00
93.8%
2.00
14.3%
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
6.3%
4
4
4
4
4
8.80
62.9%
3.20
3.20
2.80
2.60
2.80
11.40
71.3%
8.00
57.1%
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
11.00
68.8%
2.17
15.5%
0.84
0.84
0.45
0.55
0.45
1.67
10.5%
6.00
42.9%
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
9.00
56.3%
11.00
78.6%
4.00
4.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
13.00
81.3%
5.00
35.7%
2.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.00
25.0%
5
5
5
5
5
12.50
89.3%
2.50
3.50
3.50
4.00
2.50
13.50
84.4%
12.50
89.3%
2.50
3.50
3.50
4.00
2.50
13.50
84.4%
0.71
5.1%
0.71
0.71
0.71
0.00
0.71
2.12
13.3%
12.00
85.7%
2.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
2.00
12.00
75.0%
13.00
92.9%
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.00
15.00
93.8%
1.00
7.1%
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
3.00
18.8%
2
2
2
2
2
11.39
0.81
3.22
3.61
3.33
3.56
2.83
13.33
0.83
12.00
0.86
3.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
3.00
13.50
0.84
2.30
0.16
0.65
0.70
0.59
0.70
0.62
2.06
0.13
6.00
0.43
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
9.00
0.56
14.00
1.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
16.00
1.00
8.00
0.57
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
7.00
0.44
18
18
18
18
18

was implemented. This is reflected in the ratings in Table 3. Community involvement and
problem analysis tended to be the items on the strategy checklist that sites did not implement.
The lack of problem-solving efforts were a common reason why the rubric ratings for adaptation
were not consistently high. Overall, though, sites implemented this strategy with fidelity due to
the strategy’s heavy emphasis on rational choice and deterrence concepts.
Similarly, CPTED programs in GIVE sites tended to focus on increasing surveillance,
visibility, and lighting with the primary goal of increasing the likelihood of being arrested
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(deterrence theory) or increasing the perceived likelihood of being caught (rational
choice/situational crime prevention). Although physically altering the environment to increase
the difficulty of committing crimes is a key component of CPTED as well as situational crime
prevention theory, sites tended not to utilize these components of the strategy. Table 4 shows that
sites therefore did not meet many items on the strategy checklist and did not adhere all that well
to the model or deliver CPTED with an intensity that matched their violence levels.
Table 4: All Evaluation Instrument Item Ratings for the CPTED Strategy by Site Group

Group
H

M

L

A

C

All Sites

Stat
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N

CPTED
CPTED
CPTED
CPTED
Rubric:
CPTED CPTED
Strategy Strategy
CPTED
CPTED
Rubric:
Partner CPTED
Fidelity Fidelity
Checklist Checklist
Rubric: Rubric:
Quality of Respon- Rubric:
Rubric Rubric
Total
Percentage Intensity Adherence Delivery siveness Adaptation Total
Percentage
5.00
55.6%
2.33
3.00
2.67
3.00
1.67
10.33
64.6%
4.00
44.4%
2.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
10.00
62.5%
1.73
19.2%
0.58
0.00
0.58
1.00
0.58
0.58
3.6%
4.00
44.4%
2.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
10.00
62.5%
7.00
77.8%
3.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
2.00
11.00
68.8%
3.00
33.3%
1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
6.3%
3
3
3
3
3
3.50
38.9%
2.00
2.50
2.25
2.50
1.75
9.00
56.3%
3.50
38.9%
2.00
2.50
2.50
2.50
1.50
9.00
56.3%
2.89
32.1%
0.82
1.29
0.96
0.58
0.96
3.65
22.8%
0.00
0.0%
1.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
5.00
31.3%
7.00
77.8%
3.00
4.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
13.00
81.3%
7.00
77.8%
2.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
8.00
50.0%
4
4
4
4
4
6.33
70.4%
1.67
2.67
3.00
2.67
2.67
11.00
68.8%
7.00
77.8%
2.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
11.00
68.8%
3.06
33.9%
0.58
0.58
1.00
1.53
1.15
3.00
18.8%
3.00
33.3%
1.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
8.00
50.0%
9.00
100.0%
2.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
14.00
87.5%
6.00
66.7%
1.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
6.00
37.5%
3
300.0%
3
3
3
3
3
5.50
61.1%
2.00
2.25
2.00
2.00
1.50
7.75
48.4%
5.50
61.1%
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.50
7.50
46.9%
3.51
39.0%
1.15
1.50
1.15
0.82
0.58
3.86
24.1%
2.00
22.2%
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.00
25.0%
9.00
100.0%
3.00
4.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
12.00
75.0%
7.00
77.8%
2.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
8.00
50.0%
4
400.0%
4
4
4
4
4
7.00
77.8%
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.00
25.0%
7.00
77.8%
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.00
25.0%
7.00
7.00
0.00
1
5.13
4.00
2.75
0.00
9.00
9.00

77.8%
77.8%
0.0%
100.0%
0.57
0.44
0.31
0.00
1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00
0.00
1
1.93
2.00
0.80
1.00
3.00
2.00
15

1.00
1.00
0.00
1
2.47
3.00
1.06
1.00
4.00
3.00
15

1.00
1.00
0.00
1
2.33
3.00
0.98
1.00
4.00
3.00
15

1.00
1.00
0.00
1
2.40
2.00
0.99
1.00
4.00
3.00
15

1.00
1.00
0.00
1
1.80
2.00
0.86
1.00
4.00
3.00
15

4.00
4.00
0.00

25.0%
25.0%
0.0%

9.00
10.00
3.30
4.00
14.00
10.00

0.56
0.63
0.21
0.25
0.88
0.63
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All GIVE sites implementing CPTED struggled with having resources to make large
environmental changes that would have been more in line with situational crime prevention
theory, such as demolishing abandoned buildings and installing locks and barriers. Most sites did
find resources outside of GIVE funding to install and maintain surveillance cameras, do general
property cleanup through municipal public works departments, and improve lighting. In all but
the sites with the most serious violence, it was rare for CPTED implementation to be directly
connected to gun violence deterrence, risks, and situational factors. It was more commonly used
to address quality of life issues in high-crime areas such as property maintenance, community
engagement, and low-level crimes such as trespassing in abandoned houses and drug use.
Several sites noted that this general crime-prevention work connected to gun violence because
community residents may be more likely to call the police, and community members (including
potential gun offenders) would see visible signs of law enforcement involvement in community
improvement efforts (both deterring violence and increasing police legitimacy).
It is evident from interviews that for most, the primary goal of GIVE was to identify,
arrest, and effectively prosecute gun offenders – very much in line with deterrence theory as well
as the normal role of law enforcement. There was somewhat less emphasis on preventing
violence before it happened and much less emphasis on addressing root causes of violence. Law
enforcement partners typically distrusted, felt uncomfortable, or did not believe in the efficacy of
street outreach strategies because they did not have this primary goal, although both law
enforcement and street outreach programs wanted less violence in their communities. Street
outreach programs’ goal was to prevent and intervene in violence. Law enforcement tended to
see arrest and prosecution as the only effective way to stop violence. There was a general sense
of disagreement between street outreach programs and their law enforcement partners.
Street outreach strategies align somewhat with rational choice and deterrence concepts.
Rational choice theory notes that the decision to carry and use guns is heavily influenced by
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social forces (the code of the streets), socioeconomic forces, and evaluations of risk and is also
related to age and perceived life outcomes. It recognizes that gun offenders frequently have
learned and use scripts related to the decision to use a gun in particular situations. Street
outreach strategies recognize these factors. Outreach workers attempt to help youth perceive
more positive futures. They remind them of the emotional costs of committing violence,
including its effect on their families and community members, and help them learn new scripts
and find alternatives to gun violence that maintain their respect in the subculture. In practice,
GIVE law enforcement partners typically (all but about three sites) consistently expressed
frustration that outreach workers would not give information to law enforcement to lead to arrest
and otherwise better align with deterrence goals; in other words, they were frustrated that the
strategy did not better support deterrence goals. Most did recognize the above alignment with
rational choice goals, but this was not valued as highly as deterrence goals.
The focused deterrence model, as the name implies, aligns quite well with deterrence and
rational choice/situational crime prevention theories. In call-ins and custom notifications, likely
gun offenders are presented with information about what law enforcement knows about their
activities and how law enforcement partners will respond to the next group that commits a
shooting. The theory is that this information will factor into individuals’ decision-making
process to commit gun violence by increasing. It should increase the perceived risks for
engaging in violence (e.g., federal charges and longer sentences) and through specific and
general deterrence when potential gun offenders witness law enforcement carrying out the
promised enforcement against either their own group/gang or others in the community.
Several GIVE sites were enthusiastic about the focused deterrence strategy (reflected in
high rubric scores in Table 5 for some sites in quality of delivery and partner responsiveness) and
often expressed liking it because it gave potential gun offenders fair warning about what would
happen to them. The focused deterrence concepts proved challenging for GIVE sites to
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Table 5: All Evaluation Instrument Item Ratings for Focused Deterrence by Site Group

Group
H

M

L

A

C

All Sites

Stat
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N

FD Custom FD Custom
FD
FD
FD Call-In FD Call-In Notification Notification
Rubric:
Rubric:
FD
Strategy Strategy
Strategy
Strategy
FD
Quality
Partner
Fidelity FD Fidelity
Checklist Checklist
Checklist
Checklist
Rubric:
FD Rubric: of
Respon- FD Rubric: Rubric Rubric
Total
Percentage Total
Percentage Intensity Adherence Delivery siveness Adaptation Total
Percentage
12.33
68.5%
7.00
70.0%
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.33
2.33
11.67
72.9%
11.00
61.1%
7.00
70.0%
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
11.00
68.8%
5.13
28.5%
1.00
10.0%
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.58
0.58
3.06
19.1%
8.00
44.4%
6.00
60.0%
2.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
9.00
56.3%
18.00
100.0%
8.00
80.0%
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.00
15.00
93.8%
10.00
55.6%
2.00
20.0%
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
6.00
37.5%
3
3
3
3
3
10.67
59.3%
2.67
26.7%
2.33
2.33
2.33
3.00
2.67
10.33
64.6%
14.00
77.8%
0.00
0.0%
2.00
2.00
2.00
4.00
3.00
11.00
68.8%
9.45
52.5%
4.62
46.2%
1.53
1.53
1.53
1.73
1.53
6.03
37.7%
0.00
0.0%
0.00
0.0%
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.00
25.0%
18.00
100.0%
8.00
80.0%
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
16.00
100.0%
18.00
100.0%
8.00
80.0%
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
12.00
75.0%
3
3
3
3
3
12.25
68.1%
2.50
25.0%
2.50
2.50
2.50
3.00
2.50
10.50
65.6%
16.00
88.9%
0.00
0.0%
2.50
2.50
2.50
3.50
2.50
11.00
68.8%
8.22
45.7%
5.00
50.0%
1.29
1.29
1.29
1.41
1.29
5.20
32.5%
0.00
0.0%
0.00
0.0%
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.00
25.0%
17.00
94.4%
10.00
100.0%
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
16.00
100.0%
17.00
94.4%
10.00
100.0%
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
12.00
75.0%
4
4
4
4
4
3.00
16.7%
0.00
0.0%
1.00
1.00
1.50
2.00
1.00
5.50
34.4%
3.00
16.7%
0.00
0.0%
1.00
1.00
1.50
2.00
1.00
5.50
34.4%
4.24
23.6%
0.00
0.0%
0.00
0.00
0.71
1.41
0.00
2.12
13.3%
0.00
0.0%
0.00
0.0%
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.00
25.0%
6.00
33.3%
0.00
0.0%
1.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
1.00
7.00
43.8%
6.00
33.3%
0.00
0.0%
0.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
0.00
3.00
18.8%
2
2
2
2
2
0.50
2.8%
4.50
45.0%
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.50
2.00
8.50
53.1%
0.50
2.8%
4.50
45.0%
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.50
2.00
8.50
53.1%
0.71
3.9%
6.36
63.6%
1.41
1.41
1.41
2.12
1.41
6.36
39.8%
0.00
0.0%
0.00
0.0%
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.00
25.0%
1.00
5.6%
9.00
90.0%
3.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
3.00
13.00
81.3%
1.00
5.6%
9.00
90.0%
2.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
9.00
56.3%
2
2
2
2
2
8.93
0.50
3.43
0.34
2.29
2.29
2.36
2.86
2.21
9.71
0.61
9.50
0.53
0.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
2.00
10.00
0.63
7.61
0.42
4.20
0.42
1.20
1.20
1.15
1.29
1.12
4.56
0.29
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.00
0.25
18.00
1.00
10.00
1.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
16.00
1.00
18.00
1.00
10.00
1.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
12.00
0.75
14
14
14
14
14

implement, however, which is why many of the evaluation ratings are not consistently higher.
The concepts of direct and vicarious learning about punishment and punishment avoidance are
crucial to rational choice and deterrence theories. In these communities, low-level crimes as well
as serious crimes like shooting assaults and homicides do not usually result in arrest. Therefore,
gun offenders have learned either directly or vicariously about numerous experiences of
punishment avoidance. Focused deterrence is meant to increase the certainty that gun offenses
will be prosecuted, but it does this only by focusing pre-existing law enforcement resources on
particular groups. The strategy did usually result in more coordination across law enforcement
partners than is typical and efforts to enforce low-level offenses to make groups involved in
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violence feel some deterrence even if not being directly prosecuted for the violence itself.
However, the GIVE strategies did not do much else to increase the quality of evidence regarding
who committed shooting incidents, and arrest and prosecution therefore proved very difficult.
Legal proceedings also progressed very slowly, decreasing the impact of deterrence.
Some GIVE sites in Group H began implementing efforts to increase the swiftness,
certainty, and fairness of the law enforcement response to violence. These efforts brought into
focus the difficulties that were also faced in the focused deterrence strategy of adjusting the
criminal justice processes to achieve effective deterrence. Judges have legal restrictions on
reviewing facts outside of the case at hand, preventing prosecutors from asking for special
processing of cases involving select individuals or groups. It usually takes time to gain evidence
and prepare charges for an arrest, so even when an arrest does occur, it rarely occurs swiftly,
diminishing the deterrence effect. In the focused deterrence strategy, this is why (1) law
enforcement partners enforce small crimes committed by groups they believe committed the
violence and (2) ideally inform them that the enforcement is a direct result of the shooting.
Overall, despite law enforcement personnels’ initial enthusiasm for focused deterrence
strategies, many expressed frustration with the strategy by the end of 2016 due to a perceived
inability to actually achieve a deterrence effect. Even some targeted groups with whom arrests
were successfully made on serious charges continued to commit violence in the most high-crime
areas. One site in Group H reported significant decreases in violence, and this may be because
the focused deterrence resources delivered better matched the levels of violence in that site.
Some of the small cities in Groups M and L also felt the strategy had some positive results and
success, but their levels of violence were low enough that it was hard to measure the effect. The
larger sites in Group H with more serious violence struggled to keep up with enforcement efforts
and effectively deliver on the deterrence message, perhaps leading to punishment avoidance
being a more common experience than punishment. The rubric ratings for intensity were not

NYS GIVE’S ALIGNMENT WITH THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

46

generally high, indicating that the resources delivered did not match the levels of violence in
most sites regardless of site group. The strategy checklists also indicate that sites failed to
deliver, on average, half of the strategy components. The standard deviations within the groups
are high, though, indicating that within any given group, some sites delivered many more
components, and others delivered very few.6
To summarize, deterrence concepts appear to have been readily implemented into GIVE
strategies and align well with existing law enforcement structures and duties. Many sites
struggled to provide the amount of resources that effective deterrence required, but some felt
they were having success in deterring violent crime. Rational choice and situational crime
prevention concepts were utilized but often with the goal of deterrence; it was rare for a site to
try other ways to increase the risks of committing violence or decrease the benefits besides
increasing the likelihood of arrest or severity of charges. Deterrence efforts may be more
effective if they recognized how community residents within a subculture of violence weigh the
risks and benefits of violence. Because police and law lack legitimacy in these alienated
communities and individuals have frequent experiences of direct and vicarious punishment
avoidance, a deterrence program may have to be quite targeted and strong to be effective. Any
program must recognize the ability of law enforcement agencies to effective operate and deliver
on their deterrence promises in their design so that the program goals are more realistic.
Implementation Theories
GIVE reflects many aspects of implementation theory in how it was designed and
coordinated at the state level and in how it is implemented at the jurisdictional level. This
discussion applies implementation theory concepts to each level.
Conflicting goals and monitoring. As stated in the literature review, implementation
theory was born out of fields such as health care but has clear application to criminal justice.
6

The sites in Groups A and L often stated they would implement focused deterrence but did not; they were still
rated on the evaluation instruments but had most components absent, resulting in the low ratings in Figure 4.
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The social systems and dynamics in criminal justice as well as legal restrictions must be
acknowledged when applying these theories to GIVE. The GIVE partner agencies typically are
police departments, probation departments, district attorney’s offices, and sheriff’s offices, all of
which have specific roles and jurisdictions within each community. They tend to have strong
hierarchical social structures. Most of their funding is derived from their local communities, so
as per agency theory, local politicians and, to a lesser extent, citizens have the most influence
over criminal justice agency operations. NYS DCJS provides funding for GIVE as well as other
initiatives but does not have decision-making power over the operations of these agencies. As a
state agency, they provide support but are not necessarily a licensing or oversight agency. They
do have influence in state-level funding decisions and statewide initiatives, and in that sense it
behooves GIVE agency executives to remain in good standing with DCJS. This, as well as the
GIVE funding itself, are coercive forces that promote compliance with the state’s requirements.
In line with agency theory, DCJS’s influence appears markedly higher in jurisdictions in
which the GIVE funding is a larger portion of the agencies’ operating budgets. The sites with the
largest geographies (Group C) stand out in interviews as the most independent and least
concerned with state requirements, which appears to be at least in part because of their large pool
of alternative resources. The smallest sites (Group A) express appreciation for GIVE funding but
sometimes lack the organizational resources and structures to meet all of the demands of GIVE.
They also tend to receive very little funding from the state. For example, several sites in Group
A only receive enough funding for overtime wages for police officers to do hot spot patrols a few
times a month in warmer months. Their GIVE activities are quite low in the winter. Therefore,
it appears to be the sites in Groups H, M, and L that receive sizable GIVE funding and frequently
express a desire to meet grant requirements and consistently acted in this way.
Implementation theory notes that implementers’ interests are often different from those of
the authority figure or funder. This is true between DCJS and GIVE sites as well as between
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GIVE site administrators and the agency personnel who carry out the GIVE strategies every day.
There are also sometimes conflicting priorities among GIVE partner agencies, sometimes by
design within the criminal justice system. This may be between street outreach programs and
police and prosecutor as described above, and even between agencies like probation (who tend to
focus on community-based rehabilitation) and police (who tend to focus on arrest). At all levels,
monitoring mechanisms are used to promote implementation. Implementation theory notes the
importance of program administrators appointing individuals as an intermediary form of control
who usually have political and collegial interests that align with the administrator. DCJS
appointed personnel to coordinate directly with sites, and each site designated a primary liaison.
Mechanisms within each site varied but tended to abide by the hierarchical systems already in
place. The liaison, assuming he or she had appropriate legitimacy in that community, was
generally able to monitor and leverage the support and commitment of partner agencies, with
executives stepping in as needed. Sites had better implementation if specific individuals were
assigned to oversee program components and if collective groups (particularly of administrators)
monitored processes and outcomes. Smaller jurisdictions (Group A) did not need to have such
formal structures and often operated GIVE through small informal working groups.
The evaluation team also served as a monitoring role between the state and sites. The
evaluators strove to measure implementation quality well as organizational readiness to
implement evidence-based strategies. The evaluation reported when GIVE began on the degree
to which agencies had a history of successful partnerships with the other agencies, structures in
place to monitor implementation, buy-in at administrative and mid-level management levels, and
the resources and structures in place to effectively implement the strategies.
Many of the sites also used crime analysts to help monitor outcomes and direct strategies.
Items seven and nine on the IAR (see Table 6) relate to the availability and use of data to direct
implementation decisions. Sites struggled to collect data specifically to feed back into decision-
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Each IAR Item Ratings by Group

Group Stat
H
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
M
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
L
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
A
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
C
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N
All SitesMean
Median
Std. Dev.
Min.
Max.
Range
N

IAR#1 IAR#2
IAR#4
IAR#5
IAR#6
IAR#7
IAR#8
IAR#9
ProgInfo LinkPrblm IAR#3
RoleActivity Grp
Review AvlbilityUse Resource Report IAR_ IAR
Knwldg Intrv
StructLead ofPart
Processes Planning Data
Use
Out
Total Percent
3.33
3.67
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.67
3.67
4.00
3.33 33.67 93.5%
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.00 34.00 94.4%
0.58
0.58
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.58
0.58
0.00
0.58 2.52
7.0%
3.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
3.00 31.00 86.1%
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00 36.00 100.0%
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.00 5.00 13.9%
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3.00
3.50
3.25
2.75
3.50
2.75
3.00
4.00
2.75 28.50 79.2%
3.00
3.50
3.50
3.00
3.50
3.00
3.00
4.00
2.50 29.00 80.6%
1.15
0.58
0.96
0.50
0.58
1.26
0.82
0.00
0.96 6.24 17.3%
2.00
3.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
1.00
2.00
4.00
2.00 21.00 58.3%
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00 35.00 97.2%
2.00
1.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
3.00
2.00
0.00
2.00 14.00 38.9%
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3.75
4.00
3.75
3.75
4.00
4.00
3.75
3.75
3.75 34.50 95.8%
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00 34.50 95.8%
0.50
0.00
0.50
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.50
0.50
0.50 1.29
3.6%
3.00
4.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
3.00
3.00
3.00 33.00 91.7%
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00 36.00 100.0%
1.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00 3.00
8.3%
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3.20
3.20
3.40
2.40
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.60
2.60 27.40 76.1%
3.00
3.00
4.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
3.00 27.00 75.0%
0.84
0.84
0.89
0.55
0.71
1.22
1.22
0.89
1.14 7.09 19.7%
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00 17.00 47.2%
4.00
4.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00 34.00 94.4%
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
3.00 17.00 47.2%
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
3.50
3.50
3.00
3.50
3.50
3.50
3.50
4.00
3.50 31.50 87.5%
3.50
3.50
3.00
3.50
3.50
3.50
3.50
4.00
3.50 31.50 87.5%
0.71
0.71
0.00
0.71
0.71
0.71
0.71
0.00
0.71 3.54
9.8%
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
3.00 29.00 80.6%
4.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00 34.00 94.4%
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.00 5.00 13.9%
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3.33
3.56
3.50
3.17
3.56
3.33
3.33
3.83
3.11 30.72
0.85
3.50
4.00
4.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
3.50
4.00
3.00 33.50
0.93
0.77
0.62
0.71
0.79
0.62
0.97
0.84
0.51
0.90 5.46
0.15
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
2.00
1.00 17.00
0.47
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00 36.00
1.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
2.00
3.00 19.00
0.53
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
18

making. Group L was rated the highest on this. No groups stood out on the use of data, but sites
that lacked technology or administrative buy-in for data collection were rated the lowest.
Theory also suggests the use of sanctions and incentives to monitor compliance, but this
is used in GIVE to a lesser degree. The state requires that each funded partner agency attends
monthly meetings; if they do not, one twelfth of their annual funding (equating to one month)
may be withheld. There is also an implied risk that funding may decrease for GIVE or for other
programs if sites are particularly uncooperative. Sanction and reward mechanisms within each
site vary, but this specific topic rarely came up in interviews.
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The employees of criminal justice agencies frequently interact with people from other
agencies, so while their agencies’ goals may be opposing by design, the individuals tend to
engage in mutually-beneficial processes and decisions that may differ from agency-level goals.
Because evaluators spoke with mid-level managers and executives, it is difficult to ascertain the
degree of buy-in from the personnel implementing the strategy every day. One theme from
interviews was that personnel who had significant portions of their work time funded by and
dedicated to GIVE tended to have much more stake in the outcomes and more interest in quality
implementation compared to others for whom GIVE was just a piece of their work. GIVE
agency executives did vary in their alignment with DCJS’s principles and goals, and deviations
were most obvious regarding strategies that were less compatible with traditional law
enforcement functions such as street outreach and procedural justice. As implementation theory
would suggest, those who lacked buy-in but felt they had to implement the strategies tended to
adopt them symbolically and allocate few resources. Groups A and M stand out as the lowestrated on average on the IAR item four that measures the role and activity of partners. The
highest rating was only granted if community partners were actively involved in GIVE. All of
the sites in Group H (highest rates of gun violence) and all but one in Group L (low rates of gun
violence) received the highest rating.
DCJS knew that asking law enforcement agencies to implement evidence-based strategies
could be difficult due to resistance and inevitable difficulties in changing how agencies operate.
DCJS worked to put proper supports in place. Factors in successful implementation, according
to theory, are that implementers are willing to take on a moderate amount of risk, have sufficient
resources, and believe the authority figure promoting the change is legitimate. For the day-today implementers of a strategy, adoption of change is most likely if it is perceived to be
advantageous, compatible with established methods and goals, low in complexity, has observable
processes and outcomes, and can be adopted in stages. Opinion leaders who are not necessarily
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authority figures often have substantial influence on these perceptions. DCJS has worked to offer
broad trainings from individuals and sources likely to be seen as legitimate by the implementers
of GIVE strategies. The DCJS personnel that work most closely with the sites tried to encourage
opinion leaders to engage in these activities and met with implementers frequently.
The first IAR item on program information and knowledge addresses whether the sites’
administrators and personnel are trained in strategies. Higher ratings indicate that the site is
generally well-informed about strategy models, and experts share this knowledge with others.
Most sites were rated highly with little variation among or within groups. The most variation
and lowest mean was in Group M (sites with medium rates of gun violence). Interviews revealed
that even some trained personnel continued to interpret strategy components or theory from the
lens of their prior experience and knowledge. This applies a finding from implementation theory
for agencies to the individuals; just like organizations, individuals will tend to adapt strategies to
fit their own goals, rather than adapting their goals to fit the strategy.
The second IAR item on linkage of problem and intervention rates how well the sites’
interventions matched their violence problem. Sites were rated highly with little variation among
groups. Sites focusing on aggravated assaults (Group A) had the most struggle linking their
interventions with their violence problem, possibly because the GIVE strategies are designed for
gun violence rather than assault. Interestingly, the sites with low levels of gun violence (Group
L) had the most consistently high ratings. This appears to be because the scale of their violence
problem tended to be manageable and matched the resources available from GIVE.
It is important to remember that GIVE was a shift for the state from funding Part I crime
reduction efforts to focusing resources on gun violence. It is challenging because NYS had a
historical and political expectation to provide funding to sites that do not have substantial gun
violence. At the end of 2016, DCJS was exploring other evidence-based strategies that may
better suit the needs of these sites related to drug trafficking and domestic violence.
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Implementation theory notes the importance of executive buy-in for effective allocation
of resources and staff time to support implementation. The fifth IAR item measures the quality
of working group processes and the degree of leadership involvement. Executives were
consistently involved in sites in Groups H and L. This was mostly true in other sites as well, but
it was not as consistent to have active executive involvement. Executives sometimes designated
strategy coordinators and otherwise had little oversight of the strategies. The third IAR item
measure the quality of the implementing structure and leadership. Low ratings correspond to
little leadership involvement, and high ratings correspond to strong leadership involvement and
clear implementation structures. Most sites were rated highly, as they held monthly partner
meetings and had designated individuals or teams at most partner agencies coordinating
implementation within and among partner organizations. One site each in Groups M and A
received low ratings due to a lack of structure and leadership support.
Implementation is viewed by implementation theory as a process rather than an outcome.
Agency and individual actions reflect their response to circumstances as well as their beliefs and
values. In GIVE sites where the partner agencies shared beliefs and those beliefs aligned with
those of DCJS, implementation was more enthusiastic and thorough.
While GIVE generally funded overtime initiatives and special projects, the hope was that
the evidence-based practices would get integrated into the everyday processes of the partner
agencies as to how they address gun violence. Implementation is most effective when it is
integrated into everyday practice through normative social processes among individuals who are
committed to operationalization. Almost all sites received the highest rating on the eighth IAR
item, which indicates that they found and used additional resources to supplement the GIVE
funding. This was typically the staff time of unfunded partner agencies and the regular (nonovertime) hours of funded partner agency personnel. Most sites integrated the principles and
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operations of strategies into their everyday work practice to some degree. Several district
attorneys’ offices restructured their gun violence prosecution staff.
Implementation theory acknowledges that implementers must feel capable of making the
change and feel they have the appropriate amount of resources to meet the demands, which has
proved to be a challenge in focused deterrence, CPTED, and street outreach, as noted above.
Many GIVE sites feel that more financial resources would be necessary to implement these
strategies with effective dosage, oversight, and funds for environmental changes.
Criminal justice implementation researchers note the particular tendency towards
symbolic change rather than true implementation in such organizations. Organizations tend to
maintain their own goals but work to appear like they are pursuing the funders’ goals so that
funding can be maintained. There is a strong tendency to adopt change to the agency rather than
to change the functional systems of the agency to fit the new strategy. Implementation theory
also notes the competing demands on criminal justice agencies – from the state, local politicians,
citizens, businesses, police unions, agency executives, other similar agencies nationwide, and so
on. Agencies either make change by mimicking others to maintain organizational legitimacy
(symbolic adoption), adopting change due to normative forces, and adopting change through
coercion. DCJS appeared to be aware of all of these forces and tendencies. By holding trainings
and symposiums across sites and espousing the research literature behind the evidence-based
strategies, they helped to promote at least mimicking if not normative forces; coercion was a last
resort through the grant funding. Much discussion centered around how the GIVE strategies do
actually align with the goals of the partner agencies, though they sometimes require restructuring
some processes and systems. Many agencies, over time, came to see that strategy components
could make their jobs more efficient and effective.
GIVE has certainly faced some of the common strategy dissemination mistakes described
in the literature review. Both DCJS executives and GIVE agency executives expressed
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awareness of timing implementation to match readiness; they work to obtain buy-in and
understanding through training and related efforts before fully implementing a strategy. The
state must acknowledge that evidence does not always matter in decision-making; potential
adopters sometimes have other goals or opinions about the legitimacy of research. They
therefore tried to promote feelings of legitimacy through normative forces (e.g., having
colleagues in other jurisdictions share their perspectives on the strategy’s efficacy, rather than
citing researchers). Also, due to the hierarchical nature of criminal justice agencies, it is easy to
confuse authority with influence. Across the state, DCJS worked to identify innovation
champions and give them platforms to talk about their implementation with other jurisdictions.
DCJS’s work within each jurisdiction tended to focus on gaining the buy-in of executives and/or
GIVE liaisons overseeing the strategy. Less work is done to identify opinion leaders and
innovators within the GIVE-funded agencies, though trainings and technical assistance is hoped
to reach such individuals.
Implementation theory notes that offering choices in implementation can greatly enhance
buy-in because agency executives can choose strategies that they prefer, which tend to be ones
that already align with their organizational goals and processes. DCJS offered a menu of
strategies for sites to choose what they felt would best fit their jurisdiction and also strategies
they were most able and willing to implement. Sites could also choose to supplement these
strategies with other efforts to fit local needs. Site representatives did sometimes indicate some
resentment to being compelled to do particular actions, so offering a choice was likely effective
in overcoming resistance and recognizing the diversity of the GIVE sites.
The GIVE evaluators were keenly aware of the importance of adapting GIVE strategies
while maintaining fidelity to their models. Theorists have shown that adaptation can be
beneficial if adopters understand which aspects of the intervention can be changed and which
cannot. Higher ratings on the fidelity/dosage rubric adaptation area indicate that changes were
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made that upheld the principles of the strategy and made the strategy more effective for that
jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, sites at which the executives and implementers had high degrees
of knowledge about strategies and felt the strategies were effective and legitimate tended to make
positive adaptations to the strategies. This was the exception, however. Most sites adapted the
strategies somewhat to fit local needs but without much consideration of the models. This
tended to occur within sites that were relatively disengaged from the overall GIVE process.
Others made no overt attempts to adapt strategies to be more effective for their jurisdiction; this
occurred when the sites felt they could not change any components of an evidence-based strategy
in order to maintain fidelity. DCJS and evaluators responded to both situations with increased
education and promoting discussions among sites. Interviews revealed that this, over time,
helped sites in the latter category feel more confident about adapting strategies to their needs,
especially if proposed changes were discussed with DCJS representatives beforehand.
DCJS’s design of GIVE from the start of the program appeared well-informed about
implementation theory and the challenges of asking criminal justice agencies to make a change
to how they approach gun violence. Many of these strategies appear effective, but sites still vary
in their degree of buy-in, firm structures to support implementation, and ultimately effectiveness.
Discussion and Conclusion
The GIVE strategies (focused deterrence, hot spots policing, street outreach, and CPTED)
and GIVE’s emphasis on the integration of procedural justice principles align well with many of
the concepts in subculture of violence theory, rational choice and situational crime prevention
theory, and deterrence theory. Misalignment with theoretical principles can be understood
through the lens of implementation theory. The best alignment tended to occur across all
strategies with deterrence theory. As hypothesized, this theory best aligns with the pre-existing
structures and functions of the funded criminal justice agencies. Agencies were therefore readily
able to implement deterrence-related strategies and processes. Interestingly, despite the close
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theoretical alignment between rational choice/situational crime prevention theory and deterrence
theory, rational choice concepts were implemented and discussed much less frequently in
interviews. When resources were found to make modify criminogenic environmental conditions,
they tended to have the primary purpose of increasing the likelihood of arrest rather than making
crime commission more difficult. The street outreach strategy by design integrates many of the
concepts from subculture of violence theory, but, as hypothesized, the law enforcement
personnel leading the GIVE strategy tended to discount the value or distrust these methods.
GIVE is a great opportunity to study the integration of various strategies and theoretical
perspectives in implementation across diverse sites. The next paper in this series elaborates on
these findings by more closely examining whether the GIVE strategies align with the procedural
justice principles expected to be integrated throughout GIVE.
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Chapter 5: Procedural Justice and Communities
New York State’s Gun Involved Violence Elimination (GIVE) initiative seeks to reduce
the incidence of shootings and shooting-related deaths in the state by funding the implementation
of evidence-based strategies and related initiatives in the seventeen highest-crime counties.
Funded partner agencies are expected to focus on the people and places at highest risk for gun
violence while promoting alignment of resources among partner agencies and engagement of the
community. Evidence-based strategies that sites could choose include focused deterrence, crime
prevention through environmental design (CPTED), street outreach, and hot spots policing. Sites
are required to use problem-oriented policing (POP) methods and promote procedural justice
principles in each all GIVE strategies.
This paper will examine how the GIVE program may impact the communities in which it
operates, focusing on GIVE partners’ implementation of procedural justice principles. Funded
law enforcement agencies are expected to acknowledge the needs of and work closely with
community agencies and residents, but this is often difficult. There are both logistical and
philosophical problems that impede the effective integration of community members and
organizations into GIVE strategies and create potential for negative impacts of strategies on the
community, even if violent crime is reduced. This paper will review these problems as discussed
in literature on each strategy and based on what has been learned from evaluating GIVE sites.
Each evidence-based strategy will first be reviewed for how they may impact communities and
how community members and organizations can have a role in the strategy. Common problems
across strategies and possible frameworks through which to view potential solutions are
presented.
“GIVE-Menu” Evidence-Based Strategies
Several GIVE strategies are meant to address gun violence primarily through policing and
prosecutorial practices. Community members have integral roles, though, in reaching high-risk
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individuals for prevention and intervention and in assisting in prosecution. In this section, we
review each of the GIVE strategies that jurisdictions could choose to implement. They are
reviewed independently here to explicate how the strategies’ models integrate and affect
communities, though multiple strategies are implemented together in reality.
Procedural justice. The Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) that oversees
GIVE has mandated that GIVE jurisdictions integrate the principles of procedural justice into
each GIVE strategy and into their overall work. They are also encouraged to generally engage
with community members and organizations in comprehensive violence reduction plans.
The concept of procedural justice begins with the acknowledgement that if people believe
that police authority is legitimate, they are more likely to cooperate with police orders and obey
the law (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Meares, 2010; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). People perceive police
as legitimate if they feel that police are trustworthy, honest, and concerned about citizens’ wellbeing (Meares, 2010). Research in police legitimacy finds that different groups of citizens such
as minority groups, illegal immigrants, or those with certain cultural backgrounds differ in the
degree to which they feel that police and law have legitimacy; police and the criminal justice
system must understand these different perspectives to garner the support and compliance of
estranged communities (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Clearly, police legitimacy is important for any
crime prevention or intervention strategy, especially in communities impacted the most by gun
violence. It is crucial to the police’s role in maintaining order and in securing cooperation from
witnesses and community members in police initiatives and investigations.
Actual experiences with the police can increase a person’s sense of police legitimacy if
the way in which the officer exercises his or her authority is seen as procedurally just (Tyler &
Fagan, 2008). Extensive research has shown that quality of the decision-making process
(fairness and neutrality) and the quality of treatment (courtesy and respect) in a citizen-police
interaction both influence perceptions of procedural justice. If citizens perceive police actions as
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procedurally just, citizens are more likely to have favorable feelings towards police and the
decisions they make, no matter the outcome or decision made (Meares, 2010; Mazerolle,
Antrobus, Bennett, & Tyler, 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Blader & Tyler, 2003). Blader and
Tyler (2003) further note that in addition to the actions and decisions of individual law
enforcement personnel, the systems and rules within the criminal justice system operates must be
perceived as procedurally. In practice, then, procedural justice principles of fairness, trust,
respect, and listening to what citizens have to say are especially important for promoting police
legitimacy in communities experiencing high degrees of violence, where police-citizen
interactions are more common and often more crucial.
The major difficulty GIVE sites have had with implementing procedural justice is that it
is a philosophy rather than a strategy. DCJS acknowledged this and moved from treating it as a
strategy in the first year of GIVE to treating it as an underlying philosophy in the second year.
Jurisdictions were to incorporate principles of procedural justice into all GIVE efforts and across
all partner agencies. This has been very difficult because there is not a manual or many readilyavailable trainings on how to “do” procedural justice or effectively integrate it into the strategies.
A further concern is that the reaction of criminal justice personnel to the procedural
justice philosophy is often contradictory. Some expressed in evaluator interviews that they do
not need training because they already treat people fairly and respectfully. They feel that current
training in ethics and community policing, for instance, is sufficient. Others expressed dislike
for some of the fundamental tenants, such as acknowledging the historical role police have
played in enforcing racist policies. One said, “My officers are not about to apologize for things
that happened 300 years ago.” A more common complaint was that officers did not have time to
explain their actions to people or did not see the importance of focusing on citizen perceptions
considering their other duties of safety and security. Though not stated directly, many implied
that they reserve using procedural justice for those who are not in conflict with the police; once
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someone commits a crime, particularly gun crimes, criminal justice personnel are less apt to
maintain these principles in systemic and individual interactions, for both safety reasons or
because they believe it is their duty to remove high-risk individuals from the community.
This overview of procedural justice will be referenced throughout this paper. Each
strategy will be discussed in terms of how procedural justice principles can be upheld as well as
how strategies, in design and implementation, integrate and impact residents and organizations.
Problem-oriented policing (POP). Similar to procedural justice, POP was treated in the
first year of GIVE as a strategy; in the second year, DCJS mandated that POP be used in each of
the four other strategies. POP requires police to identify, analyze, and respond to underlying
problems that contribute to crime. This is a shift away from traditional policing that is focused
on responding to calls for service. The framework demands that police draw on a wide range of
potential solutions to crime, including criminal law, civil law, other governmental agencies, and
community resources. The SARA model is frequently used in POP approaches, which describes
the steps of scanning for problems, analyzing the problem and potential responses to it,
responding to the problem using a wide range of methods and resources, and assessing the
effectiveness of the responses utilized. These principles have been effective in addressing
diverse problems at both small and large scales (Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy
(CEBCP), “Problem-Oriented Policing,” n.d.). Research has shown that POP strategies that
include the involvement of citizens may reduce the prevalence of murder (White, Fyfe,
Campbell, & Goldkamp, 2003). Ideally, any POP strategy will draw on community resources
and insights and promote the mobilization of residents and organizations as part of the solution.
“Effective problem solving requires responsiveness to citizen input about community needs as
well as about the best ways the police can help address them” (Skogan et al., 1999, p. 66).
Community members are likely to identify different problems or prioritize them
differently than law enforcement and therefore should be involved in the scanning step of the
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SARA process. The analysis stage should consider the communities’ ideas for solutions. Often,
law enforcement agencies are not aware of community resources available or of certain
dynamics of a problem, so collaboration in analysis stage is crucial. Finally, assessment of the
strategy outcomes should measure community impact such as satisfaction and engagement.
Despite the clear community role at every stage of SARA, “rarely can the community at
large help with the specialized technical work involved in problem analysis, solution
development, and evaluation” (Clarke & Eck, 2005, p. 22). Another challenge is securing and
maintaining the involvement of the public in problem-solving efforts, especially in disorganized
communities; sustained collaboration requires major shifts in how police and communities
interact to solve problems (Skogan et al., 1999). Maquire, Uchida, and Hassell (2015) showed
that in one city, problems to be addressed were nominated by law enforcement in 69.2% of POP
efforts. The community was most involved in the response stage, and businesses were more
involved than citizens. The levels of community engagement in scanning and analysis seem
lower than the POP model seems to dictate, even in a city well known for its strong use of POP.
Finding a role for the community in addressing gun violence can be particularly difficult
due to the threats against those who assist police and that those involved in gun violence tend to
be particularly alienated from law enforcement and sometimes even their community. Further,
individuals involved in gun violence make up a very small portion of people in even the highestcrime areas. Police are often surprised to find the public more concerned about disorder and
quality of life issues than violence (Skogan et al., 1999). Lastly, law enforcement strategies to
address gun offenders are often harsh and can alienate communities.
In terms of impact, POP strategies have been shown to have a small but statistically
significant effect in reducing levels of crime and disorder (Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle, & Eck,
2008). It is less clear how else the strategy affects communities. One study found no statistically
significant changes to perceptions of crime and disorder, perceived safety, satisfaction with
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police, or procedural justice after POP was implemented in hot spots in Philadelphia (Ratcliffe,
Groff, Sorg, & Haberman, 2015). It is plausible, though, that achieving reduced crime and
disorder would have positive effects on the community, unless the methods used to achieve such
results were overly harsh, perceived as unfair, or otherwise alienated the community.
Hot spots policing. Hot spots policing strategies focus police resources in the small
geographic areas where crime is concentrated as well as on chronic offenders. The actual
interventions generally involve traditional policing such as saturation patrols, zero tolerance, and
“broken windows” type policing (National Institute of Justice, n.d.). Ideally, POP methods are
used to address underlying conditions that contribute to the persistent crime problem, and
procedural justice is used to promote police legitimacy in the area.
While research has shown that having police simply spend more time in a hot spot or do
traditional policing activities can reduce crime levels in hot spots and diffuse some benefits to
surrounding areas (CEBCP, “Hot Spots Policing,” n.d.; Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2014),
POP and situational crime prevention yield consistently better crime reductions (Braga & Bond,
2008; Braga & Weisburd, 2010). POP and situational crime prevention involve examining
problems beyond the traditional scope of policing. There is therefore an inherent and necessary
role for community residents, organizations, and governmental agencies beyond law enforcement
in hot spots policing: to help address the underlying factors contributing to the crime problems.
“Regardless of the specific approach employed or tactics engaged, hot spots policing
will generate an increased amount of police-citizen contacts in very small areas” (Weisburd &
Braga, 2013, para. 5). Police behavior will influence residents’ sense of police legitimacy and
procedural justice. “Like crime, poor police-community relationships are not evenly spread
throughout city environments” (Weisburd & Braga, 2013, para. 6). Residents in hot spot area are
the most vulnerable to victimization and are often dissatisfied with police because of high crime
levels or because of negative police interactions. Engaging community members in POP
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strategies within hot spots and focusing enforcement efforts on only serious offenders is likely to
both prevent crime and improve police-community relations (Weisburd & Braga, 2013).
Research regarding hot spots policing’s impact on communities is mixed. Hot spots
policing can have negative impacts on police legitimacy, police satisfaction, feelings of safety,
and procedural justice, especially in nonwhite and poor neighborhoods with historically poor
police relations (Braga & Weisburd, 2010; Haberman, Groff, Ratcliffe, & Sorg, 2016). Also,
some researchers warn that some types of hot spots policing activities could contribute to the
destabilization of neighborhoods by increasing the likelihood that more low-income, nonwhite
men will be involved in the criminal justice system and incarcerated (Kille, 2013).
Haberman et al. (2016) found that residents in violent crime hot spots who were younger,
more educated, more fearful of crime, perceived higher social disorder, or perceived higher
procedural injustice had lower levels of police satisfaction. While different demographic groups
had different sentiments towards police, the same study found no statistically significant
differences in perceptions of crime and disorder, perceived safety, satisfaction with police, or
procedural justice on pre-/post-intervention surveys, regardless of whether the policing efforts
conducted were foot patrols, POP, or offender-focused policing (Ratcliffe, Groff, Sorg, &
Haberman, 2015). Weisburd, Hinkle, Famega, & Ready (2011) also found “that recent criticisms
of hot spots policing approaches which focus on possible negative ‘backfire’ effects… may be
overstated… [R]esidents are not aware of, or much affected by, a three hour per week dosage of
aggressive order maintenance policing on their blocks” (p. 297).
Research may be mixed because of the range of interventions that are used in hot spots
and because of the diverse contexts in which the strategy is implemented. Even if there is not a
negative impact of most hot spots strategies on communities, it seems advisable for efforts to
take a problem-solving and procedurally just approach that integrates the community to increase
the chance it will reduce crime, improve relations, and maintain positive results.
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Focused deterrence. Focused deterrence is POP method in which law enforcement and
social service providers target the highest-risk gun offenders. It aims to deter gun violence by
explaining to high-risk offenders that violence will not be tolerated, informing them of the
consequences for engaging in violence, and offering services (National Institute of Justice (NIJ),
“Focused Deterrence Strategies,” n.d.). In GIVE, this strategy is typically operationalized
through “offender call-in” events in which representatives of gangs or groups are delivered the
deterrence and support message at a highly coordinated event. Many jurisdictions also use
“custom notifications” to deliver the deterrence and support messages to individuals at home.
Focused deterrence strategies integrate community members by “decreasing opportunity
structures for violence” through POP/situational crime prevention, “deflecting offenders away
from crime” through social services, “increasing the collective efficacy of communities” through
community collaboration, and “increasing the legitimacy of police actions” by using procedural
justice when communicating with offenders (Braga & Weisburd, 2012, p. 26). The model for
call-ins requires that presenters include social service providers, community members affected
by gun violence to “lend moral voices against gun violence,” and former gang- or gun-involved
individuals who can bring credibility to the message about changing one’s life choices (Griffiths
& Christian, 2015, p. 574). Several GIVE jurisdictions involve “influentials” (family and loved
ones of targeted individuals), hoping that they can help to influence the person’s behavior.
Achieving this community engagement is often problematic. Social service agencies and
community members are often quite willing to participate in the call-ins and support targeted
offenders. Law enforcement, however, has less belief in the value of the services and community
components. Law enforcement’s belief tends to be that very few targeted individuals will engage
with services, and even fewer will make significant-enough behavioral changes. For the most
part, they have been correct; only a few targeted individuals in all sites actually engage with
services, and many recidivate. Nonetheless, most law enforcement personnel feel that it is
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important to offer the targeted individuals alternatives to violence and gangs, and they value the
support and engagement of community members and service agencies.
There are two other major obstacles to the ideal community role in focused deterrence.
First, social service agencies are rarely a funded GIVE partner, limiting the resources they can
spend on this very high-risk, high-need, and difficult-to-engage population. Some jurisdictions
hired a case manager that connects the targeted individuals with services, and this was helpful in
promoting engagement with services. Secondly, focused deterrence strategies are meant to use
multiple resources to change the behavior of those involved in violence through deterrence,
support, and decreasing opportunities for crime. Most jurisdictions monitor violence after callins and conduct enforcement against groups involved in violence to deliver on deterrence
message. This usually only involves law-enforcement, rarely involving or consulting community
partners. Also, reducing opportunities for crime through situational crime prevention or POP is
usually seen as separate from focused deterrence and implemented disjointedly if at all.
Brunson (2015) notes a third concern. In formulating partnerships with community
leaders and groups for focused deterrence, law enforcement should not avoid working with
“unconventional” groups or people such as prior offenders or “organizations that have previously
openly challenged the department’s crime control policies,” as these groups “might have huge
credibility among neighborhood residents” (p. 511). Such engagement can provide further
legitimacy to law enforcement’s deterrence message and the message of wanting to support those
involved in gun violence in ceasing such activity because the community cares about them. In
Boston, where this strategy was developed, a community collaborative worked between police
and the community to promote trust, legitimacy, and the anti-violence message (Brunson, 2015).
The impact of focused deterrence on police-community relations or other community
indicators has not been researched as thoroughly as other strategies. In theory, focused
deterrence directs police efforts at chronic, high-risk offenders, rather than indiscriminately

NYS GIVE’S ALIGNMENT WITH THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

66

policing entire neighborhoods or demographic groups like stop and frisk or zero tolerance. This
should increase the community’s sense of police legitimacy (Brunson, 2015). The partnerships
between law enforcement, service providers, and community groups should also lead to stronger
violence reduction efforts and perhaps more holistic resources to address the problem.
Furthermore, informing those involved in group violence about what law enforcement
knows about their activities and the consequences for continued violence promotes transparency.
Nonetheless, empirical evidence is lacking about whether call-in participants or their loved ones
or associates actually perceive legitimacy in this process. One study has shown that the public in
areas where focused deterrence strategies are implemented had increased confidence in the
police and interest in partnering in police efforts when they perceived fairness and program
effectiveness in reducing crime (Brunson, 2015). “Legal authorities’ public displays of
procedural justice and compassion for call-in participants might lead to greater police legitimacy
and community support” (Brunson, 2015, p. 509). Indeed, several GIVE jurisdictions have
noticed increased positive feelings, buy-in, trust, and engagement from targeted offenders’ family
members once the deterrence message was supplemented with messages of support and
provision of services. This shows the importance of actually following through on both the
deterrence and support promised during call-ins and custom notifications to gain and maintain
trust. It is important to remember that law enforcement is likely to only be aware of a small
portion of the criminal activity in which participants are involved and likely is not aware of their
non-criminal goals and behaviors. Erratic, delayed, or weak deliverance of the promised
deterrence or support can undermine perceived fairness, trust, and legitimacy.
A final concern is that the law enforcement definition of group/gang associations may
differ from the community’s or group members’ definitions. Often in GIVE sites, participants
deny involvement with the groups they have been associated with by law enforcement, and law
enforcement sees this as lying to claim innocence. It is possible, though, that law enforcement’s
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definitions are inaccurate or do not capture the complexity of the social structures in which
participants are engaged. If participants feel unjustly targeted, fairness is undermined; if police
data is simply wrong, legitimacy and fairness are undermined. Using information other than law
enforcement data could help determine accurate group associations. In one GIVE site, street
outreach workers review the potential call-in invitees to determine if they are still active in gangs
and violence so they do not deliver the focused deterrence message to those who do not need it.
Griffiths and Christian (2015) note that violent gangs exist within non-criminal social
networks. If participants’ law-abiding associates perceive law enforcement efforts against the
participants as aggressive, unwarranted, or in violation of civil rights, police-community
relations can be harmed. This can result in a vicious cycle of decreased community cooperation
in solving violent crimes, which then undermines law enforcements’ ability to follow through
effectively on the deterrence message. Law-abiding friends and family should been seen as allies
in the behavior change process for gun-involved individuals. Law enforcement must recognize
that such people often have the same goal as law enforcement – to stop the person’s involvement
in gangs and with guns – but do not wish to see them harmed or treated unfairly.
The focused deterrence strategy is challenging due to its requirement for sustained,
focused enforcement and support. The unique features of implementation determine the impact
on the community and police-community relations. It is “important to evaluate directly the
perceptions and responses of those who are the subjects of focused deterrence interventions and
to consider the broader collateral consequences of any initiative with a threat-based component
for police-community relations” (Griffiths & Christian, 2015, p. 578).
Street outreach. Most GIVE sites that use street outreach implement SNUG, a New
York State-funded replication of the Chicago Cure Violence model with some modifications.
Cure Violence uses a public health approach to reduce gun violence by using “credible
messengers” (those formerly involved in gun violence) to engage with the individuals in the
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community at highest risk for shooting or being shot. Outreach workers and violence
interrupters conduct street-level outreach to build relationships with gun-involved groups,
educate the wider public, organize community mobilization events, and involve faith leaders,
service agencies, and law enforcement to change the norms about the appropriateness of gun
violence and interrupt and resolve violent disputes. Community members play a large role in
providing information about violent disputes to outreach workers so they can intervene. The
programs also support gun-involved individuals in accessing social services and opportunities
such as employment and education to address their underlying needs (NIJ, “Program Profile:
Cure Violence (Chicago, Illinois),” n.d.).
The community role is larger in this strategy than in most GIVE strategies because the
outreach programs are led by non-profits. Programs hold regular meetings of partners, and
resources are leveraged from partner agencies to connect gun-involved community members to
services. Partner agencies also assist in public education. Community members attend marches
and vigils. Churches provide services and promote community organizing in addition to their
spiritual functions, and clergy serve as opinion leaders in the community. Business owners often
display posters as part of the public education effort and can provide employment opportunities
and monetary support. Outreach staff also do presentations at schools and work with staff to
address youth concerns (Skogan et al., 2009).
Outreach programs often have strained relations with law enforcement, but a relationship
is necessary. The programs need police information about shootings and homicides to identify
target areas and plan responses. Police often support the outreach events with personnel and
security, and police often serve on the hiring panels for outreach program staff. However, if the
outreach programs were to share information with police, their credibility and perhaps safety
would be threatened; as such, some animosity is often evident between outreach programs and
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police because police feel the programs should provide more information to the police. Law
enforcement also often believe the outreach staff may still be involved with gangs and guns.
While community organizations and residents have a very clear role in street outreach,
there is little research specifically on the impact of these programs on communities except that
they have been proven to reduce gun violence. One study found that youth in an area with street
outreach workers felt that the outreach workers made their community a better place and that the
workers were helpful and respected by youth. Many youth who did not interact with outreach
workers did not know of them, but those that did work with them often got help finding a job or
resolving a conflict (Pollack, Frattaroli, Whitehill, & Strother, 2011).
Other presumed community benefits of street outreach programs include (1) more social
organization and collective efficacy through community mobilization and public education
efforts to change norms about violence, (2) more ability for disconnected neighborhoods and
community members to access resources (social capital), and (3) if effective at connecting youth
to resources such as jobs or education, increases in human capital. Research is needed on
whether these impacts are actually realized in areas that employ street outreach workers.
GIVE law enforcement representatives in most jurisdictions reported positive feelings
about community marches and vigils organized by the programs in response to shootings as well
as effective de-escalation of violent disputes, but it is rarer for other community impacts to be
discussed. A street outreach program director from one site felt that community mobilization
efforts after shootings actually distance the community and increase fear of crime because the
efforts appear short-lived and do not solve underlying problems. More attention should be paid
to measuring the community impact and the nature of the relationship between the programs and
the community as well as the relationship the outreach programs have with law enforcement.
Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). CPTED strategies use
“the proper design and effective use of the built environment [to] lead to a reduction in the fear
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and incidence of crime, and an improvement in the quality of life” (C. Ray Jeffrey, 1971, as
quoted in National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC), 1997/2009). CPTED practitioners assess
the environmental features of areas with high and/or chronic crime to promote access control
(how people enter and leave spaces), surveillance (maximizing visibility), territorial
reinforcement (defining ownership of spaces, rules, and regulations), and maintenance (upkeep
of structures and properties) (NCPC, 1997/2009, p. 8).
CPTED is a problem-solving strategy that falls under the umbrella of POP. As such, it is
most effective when it integrates law enforcement as well as community organizations, parochial
institutions, governmental agencies, and residents. In assessing spaces for crime-supporting
features, practitioners are encouraged to inventory the community’s available resources. While
law enforcement personnel often lead CPTED initiatives, many of the possible solutions to
underlying problems cannot be achieved by law enforcement alone. Common CPTED strategies
include improving lighting, removing foliage, eliminating hiding spots, changing foot and
vehicular traffic patterns, installing cameras, posting rules about the proper use of spaces and
consequences for violations (and enforcing it), installing locks or barriers, using police foot and
bicycle patrols to reach hidden areas, holding events in public spaces, boarding vacant properties,
painting community murals on graffiti-prone walls, organizing clean-up activities, changing
business operation hours, and organizing neighborhood watch groups (NCPC, 1997/2009).
CPTED initiatives begin with an assessment of an area’s characteristics that provide
opportunities for crime, inventorying area resources and crime and demographic data,
documenting observations, and conducting community surveys. The survey should involve
interviewing residents, business owners and employees, and property owners about the nature of
the problem, their resources to address it, and their ideas for solutions. Community organizations
and residents then work to devise a strategy to address the problems, drawing on diverse

NYS GIVE’S ALIGNMENT WITH THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

71

resources to form a holistic response. The final step is evaluating the impact of the strategy and
ensuring the sustainability of positive results (NCPC, 1997/2009).
The community role is therefore an inherent part of a proper CPTED initiative. Even the
basic planning activities benefit community capacity building, cohesion, and efficacy. Benefits
include “increasing the capacity of residents to act in concert rather than individually,” “fostering
citizen participation and strengthening social cohesion,” promoting an “interdisciplinary
approach to urban problems” that shares responsibilities and skills, encouraging better police/
community relations through community service and resident-involved anti-crime programs,
bringing external resources such as development and revitalization funding to communities, and
institutionalizing crime prevention policies and practices into private and public agencies (e.g.,
by altering building codes and regulations) (Fennelly & Crowe, 2013, p. 33-35). If properly
done, CPTED strategies promote collective efficacy, social organization, and social capital.
Saville and Cleveland (2003a, 2003b) discussed a “second generation CPTED.” They
note that the traditional CPTED concepts are only created, enforced, and maintained through
social capacity and cohesion; the goal is for community members to maintain control and
ownership of spaces for legitimate, positive purposes by appropriate people. “CPTED builds the
social connections between people, local culture and their social ecology by bringing them
together in common purpose” (Saville & Cleveland, 2003a, p. 8). First-generation CPTED
focuses on altering the physical built environment, while second-generation emphasizes the need
for establishing proper social controls over areas. Without proper social integration, firstgeneration CPTED “can unintentionally create desolate and alienating places” and promote a
“fortress mentality” (Saville & Cleveland, 2003a, p. 8). They suggest access control and
surveillance strategies that do not barricade people from interacting with one another. “CPTED
strategies must aim to build… a sense of community” (Saville & Cleveland, 2003a, p. 8).
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Second generation CPTED promotes four concepts in addition to traditional CPTED
components: community culture, connectivity, neighborhood threshold, and social cohesion.
Community culture promotes community events and art. Connectivity relates to positive
relationships among neighborhoods and with others outside the neighborhood for resources. The
threshold concept notes that neighborhoods, like ecosystems, need balanced diversity of land
uses and activities for residents. “If the activities and land uses within a neighborhood are out of
balance, they can tip over into crime,” such as when there are too many abandoned buildings or
bars in a given area (Saville & Cleveland, 2003b, p. 5). The social cohesion concept promotes
opportunities for positive social interactions and the training and practice of positive social skills
such as communication, conflict resolution, and community justice.
In practice, second generation CPTED requires more work in the original assessment
phase, including understanding local social and political dynamics. Action research is necessary
for sustained community involvement, feeding back information to those involved and
incorporating their feedback. It emphasizes problem-based learning for a wider set of community
stakeholders than in traditional CPTED, which focuses on the designated CPTED team.
Some issues are evident in GIVE sites. Several sites noted tensions between trying to
reclaim spaces from illegitimate users (e.g., drug dealers or homeless people) and the fact that
those community members need spaces to exist; the main criticism of CPTED is the likelihood
of displacement. There is limited coordination between CPTED practitioners and institutions
such as homeless shelters to create spaces for all segments of the community. While many sites
note the need for community involvement in CPTED, they are attempting to implement such
strategies in communities that lack resources. This limits the ability to make physical changes or
promote positive social cohesion in neighborhoods. Nonetheless, most sites recognize the
relationship between CPTED and other GIVE strategies, and that connection hinges on
improving social networks, police-community relations, and resources in high-crime areas.
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Summary of Common Problems and Solutions in Violence Reduction Efforts
There are many common themes as to how GIVE strategies pertain to communities.
Communities have a necessary role in each strategy, and these partnerships tend to make the
strategies more effective. The strategies can have positive or negative impacts on communities
(e.g., on community cohesion, resources and capital, residents’ sense of safety, and rates of
crime) depending on how strategies are implemented. This section summarizes the common
problems and dilemmas for communities when implementing law enforcement-driven violence
reduction strategies such as GIVE and possible avenues for the resolution of these dilemmas.
Clarity of community’s role. Perhaps one of the most fundamental concerns is that in
each GIVE strategy, there is a clear theoretical role for community residents and organizations.
However, this role becomes much less clear upon implementation, especially when the strategies
are applied to gun violence. Law enforcement agencies are often reluctant to use community
members and agencies to address extremely high-risk places and people. Traditional policing is
strongly upheld under the unspoken assumption that the fundamental goal is to identify and
remove dangerous individuals from the community, even though each strategy in actuality
encourages a more holistic approach. For the most part, strategies are implemented with fidelity
by law enforcement, but the community role is limited. The emphasis on arrest and prosecution
overrides other (i.e., community-based) efforts. Typically, community engagement is
conceptualized only as having the goal of gaining community trust so that victims and witnesses
of shootings are more willing to cooperate with law enforcement in investigations and
prosecutions. There is little creative thinking about other benefits of community cooperation and
resources.
One reason for this struggle may be that police are trained to patrol and arrest, probation
officers are trained to monitor and limit risk, and prosecutors are trained to prosecute. Also,
though this is an oversimplification, community residents who are willing to engage with the
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police often expect the police to solve problems when called, and those unwilling to engage with
police avoid law enforcement. There are few models in people’s everyday experiences in which
effective police-community cooperation has successfully addressed deeply-rooted, complex
problems like gun violence. When there are successful efforts, they tend to be short-term, and
conditions often return to their prior state. Training or technical assistance from jurisdictions that
have achieved effective partnerships could help law enforcement and community members see
how the theoretical roles in each strategy translate into actual implementation.
Community resources needed to be effective partners. The communities suffering
from high amounts of gun violence tend also to be communities where numerous residents live
below the poverty line, lack education, are unemployed, and interact frequently with the police.
Businesses and community organizations struggle with few resources, the threat of crime, and a
low-income and high-need client base.
While DCJS funds support overtime pay for law enforcement personnel to engage in
GIVE-related activities, there is comparatively little funding for community organizations or
other municipal agencies. This reflects the assumption that the primary and most effective
strategy for addressing gun violence is traditional policing; other efforts are assumed to be
ancillary. This assumption is not necessarily incorrect, as law enforcement has the primary
responsibility for combating crime, but it does help to explain low levels of funding and thus low
engagement of community organizations in GIVE strategies in most jurisdictions. Just as the
police cannot conduct extra patrols without the funding to pay the officers, other agencies cannot
devote staff time and resources without financial support. Yet the expectation remains from law
enforcement that residents and community organizations participate in strategies. Frustration is
often expressed at how few residents, for instance, attend community meetings or events, despite
demands from the community for law enforcement to “do something” about gun violence; the
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recognition is often missing that these residents may lack resources to participate if, for instance,
event organizers do not provide child care, transportation, or effective advertising.
Residents and community groups do participate, using the resources at their disposal, as
gun violence is a major concern in these neighborhoods. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged
that the possible role community partners can play is necessarily limited by their deficit of
resources. If the community role is to truly be promoted, investment is likely needed.
Recognizing community strain. Agnew’s (1999) general strain theory of community
differences in crime rates is a helpful framework for understanding some of the problems with
the community role and impact in GIVE strategies. His theory is that community-level factors
can increase the strain experienced by individuals in a community, and this individual strain as
well as community factors influence rates of crime. This acknowledges that much of the
community-level strain is borne from factors outside of the community’s control such as
economics and historical segregation and racism.
According to this theory, “high-crime communities are more likely to select and retain
strained individuals, produce strain, and foster criminal responses to strain” (Agnew, 1999, p.
126). They are especially likely to attract and retain people experiencing economic strain due to
their need for affordable housing. Community characteristics influence the goals people pursue
and their ability to achieve them through legitimate means. People who are blocked from
legitimate means to pursue economic goals, goals for status and respect, and goals to be treated
fairly often find illegitimate ways to achieve them. Criminal cultures can develop to provide
structures to achieve such goals. Strain is strongest when people feel deprived from achieving
their goals yet are exposed to others that do achieve them. Community factors such as culture
and access to technology can influence this sense of relative deprivation. Further, community
characteristics can increase the likelihood that residents will be exposed to aversive stimuli and
increase their sensitivity to those stimuli. In fact, local cultures can come to define what stimuli
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are defined as aversive (such as small signs of disrespect). These residents are more likely to
experience negative emotions. By consequence, residents are more likely to interact with angry
and frustrated individuals. All of these factors make it more likely that someone will respond
criminally to strain. Experiencing crime directly or vicariously also increases strain. These
strains on individuals increase levels of community strain. Other community characteristics can
make it harder for people to cope with strain in legitimate ways. Community factors can make it
less costly to engage in crime and increase people’s disposition towards engaging in crime. As
such, Agnew (1999) argues that “deprived communities generate strain and crime, whereas crime
contributes to a further deterioration in the community and more strain” (p. 128).
The areas in which GIVE strategies are implemented are certainly strained communities.
There is some recognition in GIVE strategies regarding the factors external to the communities
that influence the communities’ strain. For instance, social service work often focuses on job
skill development, job placement, and improving education for clients. When trying to engage
community members or groups, however, the recognition of strain and its effects are lacking.
Crime and the lack of community engagement with GIVE efforts should be recognized as normal
responses to excessive levels of individual and community strain. This recognition can lead to
better implementation that attempts to combat underlying conditions that lead to strain and
therefore crime as well as more realistic goals for community engagement in GIVE.
Just fixing broken windows. There is an assumption that addressing quality of life
issues and disorder decreases crime, increases public trust in law enforcement, and increases
cooperation with investigations. There is some anecdotal evidence in GIVE sites that citizens are
pleased to see police addressing underlying problems and disorder (such as abandoned
properties) rather than arresting and ticketing the common resident. The more complex reality is
that many people live in communities and cultures in which cooperating with police is often
unhelpful, if not dangerous.
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The idea that “just fixing broken windows” will improve community engagement is most
evident in CPTED strategies. There is often an assumption on the part of both community
members and law enforcement that quick fixes to environmental conditions will result in quick
changes to crime. Sustained effort is often lacking, and law enforcement and community
members want to see results quicker. In a few GIVE sites, this led to some frustration and
hopelessness with strategies, which deteriorates the enthusiasm with which jurisdictions try to
improve what they do, including engagement with the community.
Clearer articulation of how specific activities fit into larger strategies could counter some
of these forces. As noted in Carr’s (2005) descriptions of successful community activism efforts,
achieving small tangible goals is necessary for maintaining citizen involvement in long-term
efforts. Rarely has a GIVE site laid out a comprehensive plan that specifies clear activities for
residents and community groups and framed it as part of a larger strategy.
Policies, procedures, and sustaining change. Many GIVE strategies are implemented
with fidelity but often superficially. It is uncommon for law enforcement to change policies and
practices, though some have. Many jurisdictions credit GIVE with providing the impetus for
inter-agency collaboration. This collaboration, however, is frequently in line with traditional law
enforcement and prosecutorial functions. Rarely do sites address policies and procedures related
to community engagement and procedural justice beyond acknowledging that procedural justice
implementation requires a cultural shift and training. Amending institutional policies as well as
metrics for success can help to sustain all GIVE strategies as well as community integration and
procedural justice.
Engaging all segments of the community. As well as not changing policies and
procedures, only some GIVE partners have changed who they work with in the community.
GIVE law enforcement agencies often engage primarily with those who already support their
work. When discussing procedural justice, for instance, it is far too often conceptualized as
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something to be used selectively with those who have not done something wrong, and it is not
typically conceptualized as something that applies to law enforcement interactions with the
highest-risk gun offenders.
Engagement with high-risk neighborhoods and groups is crucial to the success of many
GIVE strategies. Procedural justice research has shown that people who feel they were treated
unfairly by police are less likely to comply with the law. Family and friends are the most likely
to have an impact on gun-involved community members, but they are often alienated from police
and community resources. These individuals, as well as the gun-involved individuals themselves,
can provide useful feedback about proposed strategies to tackle gun violence. Street outreach
workers could be excellent resources for law enforcement to learn to work better with estranged
communities. Efforts should be made to ensure those relevant to the problem of gun violence are
truly being integrated into the GIVE strategies, in line with many of the strategy models.
Watering down procedural justice. Many GIVE representatives confuse procedural
justice with community engagement. Jurisdictions often have little direction in how to
implement the principles of procedural justice and the mandate for community engagement.
Many procedural justice efforts therefore amount to educating the community about how police
function. These efforts can promote transparency (people understand why police take the actions
they do), trust (citizens build relationships with officers and can better predict their actions), and
fairness (police practices and policies make more sense and seem less discriminatory or random).
Common programs implemented for procedural justice are Citizens Police Academies and Youth
Police Initiatives. These are more effective if they build long-term relationships between officers
and people at high risk for involvement in the criminal justice system and if the officers work to
address residents’ needs. Nonetheless, these programs do not address system-level procedural
justice, how officers interact with citizens, how the department treats its personnel, and
integrating the feedback of citizens into policies, procedures, or trainings. Further, procedural
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justice is important in all aspects of criminal justice system; it is too commonly conceptualized
as police-community relations while agencies like probation, parole, and prosecutors struggle to
conceptualize how to address it.
Further, the field of community-building notes the importance of combating traditional
power dynamics when trying to affect change. Chavis (2001) reminds us of the importance of
conflict transformation within problem-solving groups that recognizes the institutionalized
power structures in communities. Power conflicts between group partners (e.g., between law
enforcement and a grassroots organization) must be specifically “transformed” to promote
positive change. This is sorely lacking from GIVE strategies, which rely on the assumption that
arrest and incapacitation of high-risk individuals are the most effective means of crime control.
Therefore, while educational programs may be necessary for promoting procedural
justice and can be a good and tangible place to start, it is important that police departments do
not see them as sufficient for procedural justice. More GIVE jurisdictions are actively seeking
innovative ways to promote procedural justice more holistically and across all partner agencies.
Measuring community involvement. Measuring and setting clear goals for community
engagement, involvement in strategies, or procedural justice is notoriously difficult, making it
difficult to judge progress. Some GIVE jurisdictions anecdotally note levels of shooting witness
and victim cooperation and clearance rates to measure community willingness to cooperate with
the police. Others note attendance levels at community meetings and the sentiments shared.
Sites with educational programs note enrollment rates, but these only somewhat measure the
community’s interest in engaging with and learning about police. This is a narrow way to view
community engagement. It relegates the role of residents and community organizations to the
traditional policing model in which it is the police’s job to inform residents of crime problems
and how they are being addressed.
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A research partner of several GIVE sites is conducting community surveys to measure
procedural justice and police-community relations, and this is promising. Measures of
sentiments towards police and levels of involvement in GIVE efforts are likely the best measures
of community engagement, but this data is costly and difficult to collect.
Reciprocal relationship between cooperation and effectiveness. Trying to improve
community involvement in gun violence reduction strategies is a bit of a “chicken-and-the-egg”
problem: community members’ cooperation with police depends on their belief in the
effectiveness of the criminal justice system, their feelings of safety if they were to cooperate, and
high shooting clearance rates, all of which, in turn, depend on community cooperation and
engagement. Most GIVE strategies promote a problem-solving approach to slowly build
community trust and capacity, but law enforcement often wants community members to
cooperate rather quickly. Longer-term relationship building and effective partnering are likely to
address both sides of this dilemma, and many sites are working to achieve this.
Strained police-community relations and expectations. As a summary note, many
residents in areas with high rates of gun violence have grown distrustful of police due to having
personal or vicarious negative experiences with police. The police are often distrustful of
citizens as well, especially if they are associated with those involved in crime. There are also
mutually high expectations on the part of both parties: community members want police to
prevent and prosecute crimes and keep them safe in fair and just ways, and police want
community members to do more to police themselves. These strained relationships and failures
to meet one another’s expectations make it difficult to implement the community aspects of
GIVE strategies. This is where true collaborative problem-solving can help build better working
relationships and more effective strategies. If law enforcement are able to bring other partners,
including residents, schools, businesses, and community organizations, to the table to assess
problems, plan, share concerns, and implement strategies with the combined expertise and
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resources of all involved, then this could go a long way to having communities feel respected
and listened to by police (and vice versa) and promote long-term collaboration.
Discussion and Conclusion
Community participation in GIVE strategies has been difficult for a number of reasons.
Resources are limited, and there is little creativity about how to effectively utilize community
residents and groups to address gun violence. However, research is clear that holistic problemsolving approaches that include input and participation of community groups are more successful
and better sustained than law enforcement efforts alone.
POP and procedural justice serve as useful frameworks for integrating community
members and for conceptualizing the community impact of strategies. To have positive effects
on police-community relations and the community’s willingness to engage in strategies, GIVE
partner agencies should be careful about implementing heavy-handed enforcement (such as hot
spots policing and focused deterrence) so that they do not appear indiscriminate, unfair, or overly
aggressive. Gradual relationship-building, especially with the highest-risk community members,
seems to be a productive strategy and is occurring with increasing comprehensiveness statewide.
Given the right resources and roles, the models for the GIVE strategies provide ample
opportunity for law enforcement to work with communities to solve even the most significant
problems, like gun violence. Such problem-solving techniques could build community capacity,
social organization, and collective efficacy, all of which can further reduce crime.
Recommendations for improving the community engagement aspects of GIVE strategies
can be derived from McNeely’s (1999) seven requirements for successful community building:
1. Focus on shared values to bring about positive change with specific, achievable initiatives.
Implementation should expand the skills and capacities of all people and agencies involved
(human capital) and the relationships between them (social capital).
2. Initiatives should be community-driven with broad resident involvement.
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3. Strategies should be “comprehensive, strategic, and entrepreneurial,” addressing impoverished
neighborhoods’ “multiple, interrelated challenges” by tackling concrete priority issues quickly
to build confidence and capacity while developing a long-term strategy (p. 745).
4. Strategies and collaboration should be asset-based. “Identify the community’s assets and
develop plans that build on them” (p. 746).
5. Efforts should be “tailored to neighborhood scale and conditions” and the goals (p. 746).
6. Local work should be linked to resources external to that community “to strengthen
community institutions and enhance outside opportunities for residents” (p. 746).
7. The collaborative work should consciously work to change institutional racism and barriers.
Conflicts should be resolved with solutions that promote use of every partners’ perspectives
and assets, rather than blaming. “Racial prejudice can neither by ignored nor made the
centerpiece” (p. 747). Race should be recognized as part of the context of the problem.
Though most of these requirements are present in GIVE jurisdictions to some degree
(especially items one, five, and six), action is not often strong and the goals not explicit in
community-law enforcement collaborations. This paper identifies many reasons why achieving
these goals is difficult when addressing gun violence and when implementing GIVE strategies,
but it is limited in its ability to provide clear instructions for meeting the goals outlined above.
The intention is to provide a discussion of key frameworks through which community
engagement in GIVE strategies can be viewed while acknowledging the challenges. Actions
must be driven by diverse partners in each jurisdiction with the support of state resources.
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Chapter 6: Summary and Key Findings
A firm and consistent theoretical foundation can improve GIVE’s effectiveness. While
DCJS designed the program in ways well-aligned with implementation theory and theories
related to gun violence, sites vary in their understanding and use of theory. Examining
criminological theories related to gun violence (subculture of violence theory) and how to
respond to it (deterrence theory and rational choice/situational crime prevention theory) can
inform implementation. These theories are consistent with the GIVE strategy models to varying
degrees, but none of these theories and strategies are necessarily contradictory; they can
complement one another to form a holistic gun violence reduction strategy in any one site. Also,
the discussion of procedural justice principles and the potential impact of GIVE strategies on
communities confirms that the goal of integrating procedural justice and community engagement
into GIVE can be consistent with the strategies used to prevent and respond to gun violence.
Nonetheless, criminal justice and implementation theories remind us of the difficulties of
achieving implementation with fidelity to models and theory. One of the most significant
challenges is that any agency tends to resist change unless it aligns well with how they already
function and their goals. Full implementation of any GIVE strategy requires significant
resources and often changes to how criminal justice agencies interact with one another and other
community stakeholders.
Therefore, while the design of GIVE is flexible enough to allow the theories presented
here to be used as needed in any given site, implementation is not generally as comprehensive as
theories or models would recommend. Sites with the most successful implementation tend to
utilize many additional agency resources, other grants, and community resources beyond what is
provided directly by GIVE. Criminal justice agencies in these sites engage in strong partnerships
with community organizations, take advantage of DCJS and other training opportunities, and
make changes to their institutional structures to support implementation.
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Several key findings can be derived from this analysis and inform GIVE efforts.
1. Comprehensive gun violence reduction strategies should be developed after a careful
analysis of the problem, its causes and reasons for sustainment, immediate and long-term
solutions, and agency and community resources. Persistent gun violence is a problem
involving many facets of a community, and law enforcement resources form only one
piece of the solution. These aspects of POP and hot spots policing models are often
neglected in GIVE implementation.
2. Street outreach is perhaps the GIVE strategy with the most potential for improvement.
Efforts to improve this strategy must be informed by implementation theory and
subculture of violence theory. In particular, DCJS and GIVE site personnel must
recognize the tendency for sites to under-utilize this strategy or to develop strategies that
do not reflect the subculture of violence’s impact on the community and gun violence.
Because this strategy does not align with traditional law enforcement functions, few
resources tend to be devoted to this strategy by criminal justice agencies compared to
other strategies, and community organizations operating street outreach programs often
lack significant resources to hire, train, and manage these programs. A more concerted
effort to see how street outreach complements other GIVE strategies is warranted. Model
street outreach sites could train other sites, capitalizing on the legitimacy and credibility
law enforcement and street outreach workers feel for their colleagues around the state.
3. Deterrence efforts are more effective if they acknowledge and alter strategies in accord
with the subcultures of violence (considering subcultural costs and benefits of violence),
community contexts and resources, and the community’s and individuals’ historical
experiences with punishment and punishment avoidance. A general lack of this
acknowledgement in GIVE sites may explain why many are frustrated with a perceived
lack of deterrence effect from strategies such as focused deterrence.
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4. GIVE sites with low levels of gun violence can certainly benefit from the lessons about
community integration, procedural justice, deterrence, situational crime prevention, and
POP, but the problems they experience do not match the problems in other sites. There is
not significant evidence that subcultures of violence are strong in these sites, so
strategies such as street outreach and focused deterrence are likely inappropriate.
5. GIVE agency partners should have an honest understanding of their agency’s and their
partner agencies’ readiness and purpose for implementation. For instance, do
administrators intend to make changes to agency operations, personnel time, and
management structures to support implementation, or do they endeavor to use the grant
funding to support already-existing functions? Are they implementing GIVE driven by
normative, mimetic, or coercive forces? Are there sufficient resources to accomplish
goals? How well are the problem and strategies understood by agency and community
partners? If buy-in is not consistent across partners or there are not enough resources,
having this honest understanding will help those who actively want to improve
implementation to strategize more effective changes.
6. Trainings and technical assistance should engage opinion leaders, and they should
specifically address how the strategy can integrate procedural justice, community
partners, and theory to form comprehensive strategies tailored to community conditions.
7. Regularly reassessing strategy implementation, the readiness and resources of partners,
and the nature of the gun violence problem will ensure that resources continue to be used
in the most effective ways to address changing problems and conditions.
This research highlights the numerous challenges of such an ambitious statewide
initiative to reduce gun violence as well as the ample opportunities for strong GIVE strategies if
they are informed by the insights of the theories presented here and the ideal GIVE strategy
models.
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Appendix A: Sample Phone Call and Site Visit Interview Itineraries
Below are three examples of monthly phone call topics and two examples of site visit
itineraries and topics. Site names and any identifying information have been redacted.
Monthly Call Topics: Example 1 (medium-sized site)
1. October crime trends and how you’ve responded
2. Hot spot strategy updates
3. Street Outreach updates: update on [the map made by the street outreach team vs. the hot
spot map created by the police department]
4. Focused deterrence:
a. Plans for the call-in (any changes, who is invited, etc.)
b. Activities of working groups (community, services, enforcement, etc.)
c. Will you do custom notifications?
5. Procedural justice integration [and results from research partner’s survey]
6. Prosecution strategies for top offenders, focused deterrence participants
7. Any CPTED updates? How would new projects emerge?
8. Upcoming DCJS trainings and symposium attendance
9. November call/visit
Monthly Call Topics: Example 2 (large site)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Custom notification updates since mid-September (from probation and [police])
Hot spot updates: specific strategy responses, what is working well for you, future plans
DA: Status of… federal case work [against a particular gang]
At GIVE meeting, [someone] noted [that there are] different procedures at the [area’s] 2
hospitals. Is this a concern? Any plans right now to address it?
5. General question: you have a lot of GIVE-related efforts…. What works well for you in
organizing and integrating it all?
6. Start planning November site visit:
a. Meet with the service contact person for focused deterrence
b. Hot spot tours if we can
c. Any events?
Monthly Call Topics: Example 3 (large site)
1. New crime trends/problems and responses
2. Hot spot strategy updates
3. Why are call-ins done at the current frequency?
4. What criteria should people meet to be “right” for call-ins?
5. CPTED site selection based on gun violence
6. Can you send us the written plan for how CPTED sites are selected/assessed and the list
of current CPTED sites?
7. Procedural justice in each strategy
8. Upcoming DCJS training/event attendance
Site Visit Itinerary and Topics: Example 1 (Large Site)
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I. Meet [with police CPTED coordinator] for a tour of [hot spot/CPTED] areas. Questions:
1. What’s your background/training? Will you be attending upcoming CPTED
trainings?
2. What problems do you want to address in each place?
3. What changes were made in each area and how long ago? Is an update needed?
4. Any trends as to “what works” (i.e., what has long-lasting impact)?
5. What is your long-term goal for CPTED work?
II. Meet with Probation Supervisor [and other probation representatives]. Questions:
1. Confirm/check back in on general organizational structures: who attends GIVE
meetings, coordinates efforts, makes decisions (GIVE-related), status of
partnerships, etc.?
2. Updates on hot spot work (geographical areas and top offenders)
3. Updates on focused deterrence work
a. What specific work do you/PO’s do before and after call-ins and custom
notifications?
b. Do probationers ever talk about the call in or custom notification with
their PO afterwards?
c. Are top offenders placed on particular people’s caseloads?
4. Social media report: usage, what is helpful, improvements?
5. Does probation ever have direct contact with the [street[ outreach programs…?
6. Any recent changes you’ve made to improve GIVE strategies or processes? Any
improvements you would like to see about probation’s role?
7. Status of [a particular program/effort being considered]: What is attractive about
the program? What are you considering doing?
Site Visit Itinerary and Topics: Example 2 (Small Site)
I. Meet with CPTED coordinator: Questions:
1. CPTED coordinator: what is your background?
2. What kinds of recommendations do you tend to make? Are they well-received
and successfully implemented?
3. Our notes said that 4 police officers attended the advanced CPTED training in
June. Did anyone else attend?
4. Is the [CPTED-related, city-funded] program still going out once a month?
5. Have the kinds of recommendations you make been focused on reducing
violence?
6. What has the community response to CPTED been like? How do you share info
on the program?
II. Meet with GIVE liaison: Questions:
1. RMS [record management system] updates: how is the roll-out going?
2. GIVE partner attendance update, and funding of those partners
3. Did [hot spot] details start again yet? Any need?
4. Community engagement [updates]
5. Is it fair to say that the DV strategies are focused on DV offenders? You don’t
have a top offender list…, right?

